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Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and
Family
David D. Meyert
The latest numbers trickling out of the U.S. census have
provided, for many, a startling "glimpse into the shifting and
complicated makeup of American families."1 In splashy, front-
page coverage, newspapers across the country reported last
spring that the nuclear family is receding and being fast over-
taken by a variety of more unconventional family forms.2 The
number of married couples living with their children-the fam-
ily form long venerated as the social norm3-now constitutes
less than a quarter of all households.4 In their place, the cen-
t Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. I thank
Amy Gajda, Harry Krause, John Nowak, and participants in the International
Society of Family Law's North American Regional Conference, held in King-
ston, Ontario, for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Eric Schmitt, For First Time, Nuclear Families Drop Below 25% of
Households, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,2001, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Gaiutra Bahadur, Creating New Definitions for Family,
AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 27, 2001, at Al; Robin Fields, "Married
With Children" Still Fading as a Model, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2001, at Al;
Schmitt, supra note 1; Unmarried-couple households boom, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL, May 15, 2001, at Al.
3. Although the precise prevalence of the nuclear form over time has
been the subject of debate, see, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All De-
pends on What You Mean by Home":" Toward a Communitarian Theory of the
"Nontraditional" Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 589-91, there is no doubt
that it has figured very prominently for "a very long time," Lee E. Teitelbaum,
The Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 537, 538
(stating also that "[slince about 1960, research has clearly demonstrated that
the nuclear family is not the late-arising product of the industrial revolution
which, it was long supposed, broke up extended family groups"), and that it
continues to serve as the dominant normative model of family construction,
see, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Leg-
islatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 933 (2000)
(asserting that "the normative nuclear family" remains "the only legitimate
affiliative structure").
4. These "nuclear" families constituted 23.5 percent of all households in
2000, down from 25.6 percent in 1990. See Schmitt, supra note 1. Although
the absolute number of these families grew by almost six percent during the
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sus found dramatic growth in alternative family arrangements,
particularly in the number of households headed by single
mothers.5 Even more to the point, the data showed a shift to-
ward what the Census Bureau calls "nonfamily" households. 6
These households, consisting of single adults living alone or
with others who are not related by marriage, birth, or adoption,
already comprise nearly a third of all households and are grow-
ing at twice the rate of "family" households.7 This rise in the
number of "nonfamily" households, moreover, does not fully
capture the growing frequency of unconventional living ar-
rangements.8 Some of the households classified by the Census
Bureau as "family households" (because they contain two or
more people related by birth, adoption, or marriage) neverthe-
less contain broader intimate groupings that the Bureau does
not recognize as "families"--for instance, unmarried partners
living with a child who is related by birth or adoption to only
one of the partners. 9 Thus, even within the ranks of "family
households" there is a growing number of what might be called
"'nonfamily' families."
For many years now, changes in the patterns and forms of
family life have been the subject of intense and very public de-
bate.10 There has been, in various quarters, both hand-
1990s, the number of other households grew substantially faster and so the
proportion of "nuclear" households declined. See id.
5. See id. (reporting that "the number of families headed by women...
grew nearly five times faster in the 1990's than the number of married couples
with children").
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING 1 (May 2001)
[hereinafter 2000 CENSUS]; see also id. at A-2 (defining a "Nonfamily House-
hold" as consisting of "[a] householder living alone or with nonrelatives only,"
and defining a "nonrelative" as "[any household member who is not related to
the householder by birth, marriage, or adoption, including foster children").
7. See Schmitt, supra note 1.
8. At the same time, the rise in "nonfamily households" is by no means
due solely to a higher incidence of unconventional living arrangements. Most
"nonfamily households" in the census data consist of single adults living alone,
see 2000 CENSUS, supra note 6, at 1, and the increased prevalence is due
partly to a delay in the age of marriage and the fact that people, including
many who are divorced or widowed, are simply living longer, see Schmitt, su-
pra note 1.
9. See 2000 CENSUS, supra note 6, at A-1 (explaining the Bureau's defini-
tions of "Family" and "Family Household").
10. See, e.g., Martha Minow, All in the Family & In All Families: Member-
ship, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 278 (1992-93) [hereinafter
Minow, All in the Family] (noting then-current headlines and observing that
"[h]istorians tell us that Americans have worried about the family for over
792 [Vol.86:791
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wringing and celebration over the realization that individuals
are choosing to marry later or to forgo marriage altogether in
favor of a widening array of nontraditional alternatives. In-
deed, writing last year, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor needed
no citation for the observation that "[tlhe demographic changes
of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average
American family."1 Still, the swift pace of change evident in
the latest census data12 surely adds some urgency to the ques-
tion implicit in the Census Bureau's own awkward terminol-
ogy-namely, which of these intimate associations is entitled to
be regarded as "family."
There is considerable disagreement, of course, about
whether certain of the changes reflected in the census data
should be embraced or resisted in shaping policy toward the
family.13 Nevertheless, there appears to be broad consensus
that public policy should acknowledge and at least partly ac-
commodate the ongoing diversification of family life. This
seems evident in the very general movement toward private
ordering in family law-allowing couples more leeway, for in-
stance, in defining for themselves the terms of their cohabiting
or marital relationships-and in a wide scale softening of the
public penalties for entering into unconventional intimate rela-
tionships. 14 A survey of recent legislation and pending law-
reform proposals suggests a slowly broadening public concep-
tion of family, both in the United States and many other na-
tions.15
three hundred years").
11. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality opinion).
12. For instance, "[diemographers expressed surprise that the number of
unmarried couples in the United States nearly doubled in the 1990's, to 5.5
million couples from 3.2 million in 1990." Schmitt, supra note 1, at Al.
13. See, e.g., Robert J. Levy, Rights and Responsibilities for Extended
Family Members?, 27 FAA. L.Q. 191, 191-92 (1993) (recounting the inability of
a group of legal experts and social scientists to come to consensus about the
extent to which law should accommodate ongoing changes in family form).
Professor Levy observed that "UWust as the American nuclear family is itself
struggling to deal with its relationships with grandparents, stepparents, and
even strangers who may have played some kind of parent-like role, conference
participants struggled to formulate family law judicial and legislative policies
which can accommodate as well as promote stability and change." Id. at 192.
14. See infra Part IA.
15. See, e.g., William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United
States: A Review and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961, 961-63, 965-67 (discuss-
ing the growing trend toward municipal and state enactments granting legal
recognition of "domestic partnerships," both in the United States and abroad,
and observing that a common theme of these enactments is recognizing "do-
2002]
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Yet, at least in the United States, this greater generosity in
defining family has not generally been carried over to the con-
text in which the definition carries the most weight-the con-
stitutional law of family privacy. There, in marking out the
bounds of "a 'private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter,'"'16 courts have tended to adhere to a much narrower and
more traditional conception of what counts as "family." That
conception extends beyond the nuclear family to embrace at
least some forms of an extended biological family, 17 but more
novel intimate configurations-unmarried partners, for in-
stance, or the bond between a child and a non-parent care-
giver-are unlikely to be regarded as "family" entitled to con-
stitutional protection.'8 As a result, government may elect to be
magnanimous in recognizing nontraditional intimate relation-
ships-to grant individuals more freedom to define for them-
selves alternative forms of "family"-but it is not likely to be
obligated to respect the self-defining choices of those who stray
from convention. Self-definition of the family, by this under-
standing, is predominantly a matter of legislative choice, not
individual prerogative.
That family should be understood so restrictively under the
Constitution, however, is not self-evident. Indeed, the rela-
tively static way in which "family" is defined for constitutional
purposes contrasts sharply with the more fluid way in which
"religion" is conceived for purposes of protection under the First
mestic partnerships as a different form of 'family"); id. at 978-79, 989 (discuss-
ing the legal recognition of unmarried partnerships proposed by the American
Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution and suggesting
that "the ALI's placement of its recognition of domestic partnerships in the
Principles indicates its understanding of domestic partnerships as a type of
'fimctional family' relationship"). For additional discussion and authority, see
infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
16. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
17. See id. at 505-06 (holding that the Constitution protects the choice of
an extended biological family, at least in the particular "degree of kinship"
presented in that case, to share a home).
18. See, e.g., id. at 498 (distinguishing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974)). Boraas found no constitutional sense of family impli-
cated by an ordinance which regulated the cohabitation of individuals who
were not related by "blood, adoption, or marriage." Boraas, 416 U.S at 2, 7-8;
see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-24 & n.3 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion) (finding no constitutional sense of family implicated in the
relationship between a man and the daughter he fathered in an extramarital
affair); infra notes 60-92 and accompanying text.
794 [Vol.86:791
FATH AND FAMILY
Amendment.1 9 Religious liberty and family privacy both rank
as fundamental rights under the Constitution, and both sets of
rights are said to value personal autonomy in a "private
sphere" of conscience or intimacy.20 Yet, while courts give little
deference to individual conceptions of "family" that are not
validated by tradition and convention, they show considerable
deference to unconventional conceptions of religious faith. In
the context of the First Amendment, it is now accepted that re-
ligious pluralism demands that religion be understood
broadly;21 yet, in the context of family privacy, the growing di-
versity of families has not yet generated a similar consensus.22
This Article considers whether the difference in the judici-
ary's approaches to defining family and religion under the U.S.
Constitution is justified. Part I contrasts the movement toward
wider self-definition and private ordering in non-constitutional
family law with the decidedly more static notion of family that
prevails in constitutional doctrine. Part II contrasts the ways
in which family and religion are defined for purposes of consti-
tutional protection. Part III evaluates possible explanations for
the differences in constitutional approach, including family pri-
vacy's status as an unenumerated right and distinctions in the
values underlying the respective constitutional guarantees, and
concludes that none justifies the full scale of divergence.
Finally, Part IV suggests that the difference in definitional
approach masks a broader similarity in the Supreme Court's
protection of family and religion under the Constitution. In the
two contexts, the Court has used different strategies for grap-
pling with a common dilemma-the need to balance respect for
individualism in a realm of profound personal importance with
the practical exigencies of communal governance. In the con-
text of family privacy, the Court has struck the balance by de-
fining the scope of protection narrowly while promising vigor-
ous protection against popular incursions within that sphere.
In the context of the First Amendment, by contrast, the Court
has been more generous in defining the scope of protection, but
compensates for that generosity by giving less substantive pro-
tection to qualifying conduct. This Article suggests another
course: By pairing greater deference to self-definition of family
19. See Martha Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
925 [hereinafter Minow, Free Exercise of Families].
20. See infra note 131.
21. See infra Part HI.
22. See infra Part I.B.
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and religion with an abandonment of the pretense of absolutist
judicial protection, the Court could take account of the core di-
lemma while remaining more faithful to the underlying consti-
tutional values.
I. THE STATIC NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION IN
UNDERSTANDING "FAMILY": COMPARISONS WITH
FAMILY LAW AND POLICY
In recent years, a gulf has opened between the concept of
"family" accepted for many purposes of family law and the no-
tion of "family" given protection under constitutional doctrine.
While family law is increasingly deferential to individual con-
ceptions of family life, even when those conceptions are quite
unconventional, the constitutional doctrine protecting mar-
riage, childrearing, and other aspects of "family privacy" re-
mains closely tied to traditional assumptions about the mean-
ing of "family."
A. THE MOVE TOWARD PRIVATE ORDERING IN FAMILY LAW AND
POLICY
In legislation and administrative policy concerning the
family, there has been for some decades a sustained trend to-
ward permitting individuals greater freedom in defining the
content and terms of their own relationships.23 The law of di-
vorce, for instance, has comprehensively shifted decisional
power from legislators and judges-who for years intensively
regulated precisely which human foibles or failures would per-
mit dissolution of a marriage24-to the marriage partners
23. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF
INTIMACY 35-42 (1993) ("Recent years have witnessed considerably greater re-
ceptivity to private ordering of family matters. As one observer puts it, the
law 'has evolved far toward recognizing the need for private choice and the un-
tenableness of uniform public policy as a strategy for governing the conduct
and obligations of intimacy.') (quoting Maijorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual
Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 291
(1982)); Ann Laquer Estin, Can Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, 4
MICH. J. OF GENDER & L. 1, 25 (1996); Marsha Garrison, Toward a Contrac-
tarian Account of Family Governance, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 241, 241; Jana B.
Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1444-56;
Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 544.
24. See, for example, the debate between the prevailing and dissenting
justices in Palmer v. Palmer, 281 N.W.2d 263 (S.D. 1979), over whether a
wife's conduct-including, among other particulars, blocking her husband's
access to the shower "because she thought he did not need one" and "causti-
cally referr[ing] to [one of her husband's female coworkers] as his 'Wacky-
[Vol.86:791
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themselves. 25 Although the desirability of permitting "unilat-
eral" divorce remains contested,26 it is now widely accepted that
if both parties concur that their marriage is not worth repair-
ing, they are entitled to part ways.27 This is also true of the fi-
nancial terms on which they part. After a long history of resis-
tance, the law now generally allows divorcing spouses to decide
for themselves, if they can agree, how to divide their property
or whether one will support the other through alimony.28 Simi-
Dacky'"-was bad enough to permit divorce. Id. at 265 (Henderson, J., dis-
senting). The majority concluded that it was not.
25. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 31 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that "marriage as a legal institution
is being transformed from a clearly defined and legally regulated relationship
into an imprecisely defined relationship whose incidents are either uncertain
or left largely to the control of the parties to the relationship"); NANCY F.
COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 212 (2000);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1901, 1944 (2000) (noting that "the legal regulation of marriage has
undergone transformative change in the past generation," one theme of which
has been that "individuals are far freer to arrange their intimate relationships
without state coercion or even legal intervention"); Singer, supra note 23, at
1446-48.
26. See, e.g., Ira M. Eliman, The Place of Fault in Modern Divorce Law, 28
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1996); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce
Conundrum, 1991 BYEJ L. REV. 79. Three states-Mississippi, New York and
Tennessee-still condition the availability of no-fault divorce on the consent of
both spouses. See HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAAIILY LAW: CASES, COMIENTS
AND QUESTIONS 546 (4th ed. 1998).
27. See Roundtable: Opportunities for and Limitations of Private Ordering
in Family Law, 73 IND. L.J. 535, 559 (1998) (remarks of Michael Grossberg)
(describing "[tihe creation and rapid diffusion of no-fault divorce" as "one of
the most direct endorsements of private ordering ... ever attempted in Ameri-
can family law"). As Marsha Garrison has pointed out, the movement toward
no-fault divorce is only part of a wider trend in law toward a more egalitarian
model of governance within the family:
A range of legal developments dating from the 1960s and 70s re-
flects... afn] evolution in [family] governance: Constitutional monar-
chy has begun to give way to a more democratic and egalitarian gov-
ernance model. The new model does not rely on sex-based roles and
obligations or emphasize the inviolability of family ties. Instead, it
relies on gender-neutral rules and obligations .... The new govern-
ance model links developments as diverse as abortion reform, no-fault
divorce, abandonment of the "tender years" presumption in custody
law, a more functional definition of parenthood, and a children's
rights movement ....
Garrison, supra note 23, at 246-47 (footnotes omitted); see also Scott, supra
note 25, at 1944-45 (identifying egalitarianism as a central theme in the re-
cent transformation of marriage law).
28. See REGAN, supra note 23, at 148-49; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAitiiLY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.01 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft, Part I) (Feb. 14,
2002]
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larly, family law increasingly has deferred to its regulatory
subjects upon the commencement of marriage as well.29 In re-
cent decades the law has favored wider freedom in the making
of antenuptial agreements, for instance, and legislatures have
abandoned a number of traditional restrictions on entry into
marriage.30 So, too, the recent addition of "covenant marriage"
in Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas-although intended to in-
crease the durability of the marriage bond by qualifying access
to divorce-furthers private ordering by offering couples a
choice of marriage forms. 31
Beyond marriage, the same trend can be seen at work in
the public validation of a broader range of individual choice in
intimate life. Adoption laws have been loosened to allow more
people, particularly single individuals and same-sex partners,
to adopt.3 2 Indeed, some have regularized cohabitation by im-
1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES Proposed Final Draft] (acknowledging that
"[tihe trend of recent decades has been to increase the latitude of individuals
to provide in either premarital or separation agreements for the financial con-
sequences of their divorce").
29. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 26, at 188 (observing that "over the
past three decades, courts and legislatures have allowed couples much
greater-although not yet complete-freedom in negotiating the terms of their
marriage"); Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual,
Same Sex-Or Not at All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 293 (2000) [hereinafter Krause,
Marriage for the New Millennium]; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Marriage at the Mil-
lennium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 647, 657 (1999).
30. See, e.g., WALTER WADLINGTON & RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN, FAMILY LAW
IN PERSPECTIVE 14-20 (2001) (summarizing changes in laws governing entry
into marriage); Singer, supra note 23, at 1465-70 (describing the curtailment
of both substantive and formal requirements on entry into marriage).
31. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 29-30 (2000); F.H. Buckley & Larry
E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561,
572-78; Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 495-96 (1998); Eliza-
beth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1225, 1226-27 (1998). Indeed, covenant marriage has been criticized on
precisely this ground:
[Miany traditionalists fear that "any step that would explicitly 'rede-
fine marriage'-even in a traditionalist direction-is dangerous, be-
cause it opens the door to the idea of further redefining it by an act of
will." Letting couples choose their marriage regime is perilous be-
cause "once you let in the notion of choice.., you start 'privatizing
marriage,' giving the other side a basis to argue for a dozen other
choice-based innovations in family law, from 'trial marriage' to same-
sex unions...."
James D. Wright et al., Covenant Marriage: Louisiana Update, THE
RESPONSIvE COMMUNITY, Fall 1998, at 84, 85 (quoting Walter Olson).
32. Concerning adoption by same-sex partners, Jane Schacter has ob-
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posing family-like obligations of mutual support even without
the explicit agreement of the partners.33
Even through the fog of controversy swirling around the
topic of same-sex marriage, it is possible to discern movement
toward a broader public conception of family. Although a clear
majority of the American public is unprepared to extend mar-
riage rights to same-sex couples, 34 there is widening support for
the sort of compromise recently fashioned in Hawaii, Vermont,
and several European countries-extending to these couples le-
gal recognition of their intimate partnership, along with many
served,
In the last several years, courts in at least twenty-one states have au-
thorized this sort of adoption, and appellate courts in five states and
the District of Columbia have affirmed the second-parent adoption
theory. The Uniform Adoption Act... has also approved second-
parent adoption.... [Slecond-parent adoption has "become the un-
mistakable trend of the law's development in this area."
Schacter, supra note 3, at 934 (footnotes omitted); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAmILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.14 cmt.
f, at 286 (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part 1 1998) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES Ten-
tative Draft No. 3] (noting the trend and collecting additional authority). This
is not to say, of course, that the trend has been uniform. Within just the past
two years, legislation limiting (although not altogether barring) adoptions by
homosexuals has been enacted in Mississippi and Utah, rejected in Arkansas,
and repealed in New Hampshire. See David Crary, Gay Adoption Ban in Flor-
ida Faces Court Test, LA. TIMES, June 17, 2001, at A14. A constitutional at-
tack on Florida's statutory ban on adoption by homosexuals recently failed.
See Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
33. Cf Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). Marvin's willingness
to impose marriage-like obligations on unmarried cohabitants in the absence
of their explicit agreement has been criticized on the ground that it risks stan-
dardizing those who evidently preferred a nonstandard intimate relationship.
See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 79 (3d ed. 1995); Robert C.
Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status to Contract
and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47, 54-61 (1978). Yet Marvin itself pur-
ported, in the main, to be honoring the self-defining choices of cohabitants by
enforcing their own promises or "tacit understandings" of marriage-like obliga-
tion. See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122.
34. See Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex
Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1877 nn.21-
22 (1997) (discussing the popular consensus against same-sex marriage);
Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for
Unmarried Committed Partners: Empirical Lessons for a Preventative and
Therapeutic Approach, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 417, 419 (1999) (noting that "[a] 1998
poll revealed that only 29% of the general public approved of legally sanc-
tioned same-sex marriage"). The recent enactment in Congress and more than
thirty states of legislation intended to block same-sex marriage demonstrates
the strength of this consensus. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo:
The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial
Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1348-49 (2000).
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of the financial benefits of marriage, while withholding the ul-
timate status of marriage itself.35 And, increasingly, legislation
or regulations extending benefits or privileges to "family"
members have been construed or amended to encompass not
only those who traditionally have occupied that position, but
also those who functionally stand in that relation.36 Similar
35. See Katharina Boele-Woelki, Private International Law Aspects of
Registered Partnerships and Other Forms of Non-Marital Cohabitation in
Europe, 60 LA. L. REV. 1053 (2000) (surveying developments in European
law); Duncan, supra note 15, at 961-75 (noting that a growing number of mu-
nicipal and state enactments are permitting same-sex couples to claim mar-
riage-like status and benefits as "domestic partners"); Krause, Marriage for
the New Millennium, supra note 29, at 294 ("[I]f-as one might conclude from
the evidence-same sex marriage is not in America's immediate future, it
seems equally clear that broader legislation on 'domestic partnership,' extend-
ing to or specifically directed at, same sex partners will soon become wide-
spread."); Poll: Americans Support Rights for Gay Partners, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, June 1, 2000, at 7A, available at 2000 WL 5083477 (reporting that
an Associated Press poll found that while most Americans oppose same-sex
marriage, 'just as many say gay partners should have some legal rights of a
married couple-such as inheritance, Social Security benefits and health in-
surance"); Recent Legislation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1421, 1425-26 (2001) (de-
scribing Vermont enactment and observing that its relative "political stability
may make it a springboard" for similar measures elsewhere); Robert Salladay,
Domestic Partners Bills Get Green Light, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 12, 1999, at
A12, available at 1999 WL 6868190 (reporting that a statewide poll in Califor-
nia found that "voters support domestic partnerships but strongly dislike the
idea of same-sex marriages"). As recent evidence of this growing consensus,
for instance, in New York there is reportedly "broad... agreement among
lawmakers from across the political spectrum" for legislation that would ex-
pand the definition of "family" used in state domestic violence law to include
same-sex partners. See Somini Sengupta, Domestic Violence Law Set to be Re-
newed, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2001, at B6. The state's Republican governor,
George E. Pataki,
is seeking to expand [New York's mandatory-arrest law for domestic
violence], which now applies only to married couples and to unmar-
ried couples who have a child together, to all domestic partners, in-
cluding gay couples. The governor's proposal would amend the defini-
tion of "family" and "household" to include people "currently residing
together on a continuing basis, or at regular intervals" or those who
have lived together in the preceding year.
Id. (also noting that "[s]uch a redefinition has quietly garnered the blessings of
Senate Republicans, who have in the past resisted gay rights measures").
36. See, e.g., Hann v. Housing Auth. of Easton, 709 F. Supp. 605, 610
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (construing the word "family" as used in federal housing regu-
lations to include an unmarried couple and their children); Borough of Glass-
boro v. Vallorosi, 568 A-2d 888, 894 (N.J. 1990) (per curiam) (concluding that a
group of college students sharing a residence fell within a zoning ordinance's
defintion of "family" as comprised of one or more "persons... living together
as a stable and permanent living unit, being a traditional family unit or the
functional equivalency [sic] thereof); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d
49, 53 (N.Y. 1989) (construing the word "family" as used in New York's rent-
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developments are unfolding abroad. 37 Taken together, they
provide powerful support for the conclusion that "[iincreasingly,
talk about the family seems to regard that group not as a unit,
but as an aggregation of individuals who define for themselves
the relationship they enter into.... The dominant modern rhe-
torical device is to talk about the family in terms of contract
and free will."38 Perhaps the most comprehensive expression of
this trend is found in the American Law Institute's new Princi-
ples of the Law of Family Dissolution.39 The Principles, which
are not a restatement of existing law but a set of recommenda-
tions meant to "give[] greater weight to emerging legal con-
cepts,"40 consciously assign a leading role in defining family
roles and responsibilities to the individuals occupying those
roles. Recognizing that "family dissolution today ordinarily is a
negotiated process,"41 the Principles generally seek to be more
facilitative than normative.42 Although the Principles inevita-
control law to include a same-sex couple on the grounds that the statute's "in-
tended protection... should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic
history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life");
KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 26, at 13-18 (discussing these cases and other au-
thorities); Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive
Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 837, 893
(2000) (noting that "[plarenthood itself is increasingly seen as a functional
status, rather than one derived from biology or legal entitlement"); Note, Look-
ing for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the
Legal Definition of the Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991).
37. See, e.g., Boele-Woelki, supra note 35, at 1053 (surveying registered-
partnership laws in a number of European countries); Duncan, supra note 15,
at 961-62; Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium, supra note 29, at 274,
280 & n.9; Payne, Family Law in Canada, reprinted in BEREND HOVIUS,
FAHILY LAW 12-16 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing changing family forms and legal
recognition of families in Canada).
38. Teitolbaum, supra note 3, at 544.
39. ALI PRINCIPLES Proposed Final Draft, supra note 28.
40. Id. at xiii.
41. Id.
42. In this, the Principles plainly carry forward the decline in moral dis-
course about family previously observed by Carl Schneider and others. See
Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Fam-
ily Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985); Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 540; Lee
E. Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 430 (1985);
Lynn D. Wardle, Relationships Between Family and Government, 31 CAL. W.
IN'L L.J. 1, 1-2 (2000). Of course, family law has certainly not abandoned
moral discourse; as some have pointed out, in many ways the content and fo-
cus of that discourse has simply changed. See generally Naomi R. Caln, The
Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225 (1997); Jane C. Mur-
phy, Rules, Responsibility, and Commitment to Children: The New Language
of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111 (1999). But while the
emergent public morality may emphasize responsibility to children (who can-
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bly embody particular conceptions of what is "equitable" in
property distribution or alimony, for instance, the ALI most of-
ten strives to justify these conceptions with reference to the
presumed expectations of the parties rather than to an external
social norm.43
The Principles also bring within the scope of "family disso-
lution" the ending of relationships between unmarried cohabi-
tants. Chapter six of the Principles provides for the legal rec-
ognition of domestic partnerships, between couples of any
gender, and imposes obligations of support and the sharing of
property in keeping with an estimation of the parties' own ex-
pectations. 44
The theme of accommodating individual preferences with
regard to family is carried over to the ALl's treatment of child
custody as well. The Principles begin by redefining "parent" in
decidedly nontraditional terms to include some longtime care-
not really be understood as having consented to contrary terms of parental re-
sponsibility), it has ceded many claims to regulating truly consensual family
relationships.
43. This is true even of what are generally seen as the Principles' more
radical suggestions. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES Proposed Final Draft, supra
note 28, § 4.18 cmt. a, at 240 (asserting that the rationale for a provision call-
ing for the sharing of separate property upon dissolution of a long-term mar-
riage is that "[aifter many years of marriage, spouses typically do not think of
their separate-property assets as separate"); see also id. § 4.18 Reporter's
Notes cmt. a, at 253 (noting that "[diata on what spouses actually expect in
their marriage are sparse, so this section necessarily rests on assumptions
about those expectations"). Moreover, in setting out default rules governing
property, alimony, and child custody, for instance, the Principles emphasize
that parties remain free to opt out. See id., § 5.01(2) & cmt. b, at 257-58 (em-
phasizing that "the principles stated in this Chapter [concerning alimony] ...
do not create any limitations on the freedom of individuals to bind themselves
to a different arrangement in a premarital or separation agreement").
44. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.03, 6.04, at 14-55 (Tentative Draft No. 4 2000); Mar-
garet Brinig, Domestic Partnership: Missing the Target?, 2001 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. (forthcoming). While acknowledging that the ALI's principles governing
domestic partnership are based on suppositions about the parties' expecta-
tions, Professor Brinig criticizes the ALI's suppositions as erroneous. In par-
ticular, she contends that while many of the ALI principles treat unmarried
cohabitants as if they were married, most unmarried heterosexual couples do
not regard themselves as married and do not desire the legal entanglements
that come with marriage. See id.; see also David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of
Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law Institute's Principles
of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1467, 1467 (2001) (contending
that the ALI Principles ultimately "reflect a profound distrust for individuals'
efforts to set the terms for intimate relationships to meet their own needs").
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givers who lack a biological or adoptive tie to a child.45 Under
traditional family law, the romantic partner of a biological par-
ent who had been encouraged by her partner to assume a par-
enting role, or the man who cares for a child under a mistaken
belief in his own paternity, would often be classified as "legal
strangers";46 certainly, neither association would be regarded
as a "family" under current U.S. census standards.47 Under the
ALI's approach, by contrast, each caregiver would be entitled to
claim the status of "parent" and to a presumptive share of fu-
ture custodial responsibility.48 Moreover, recognizing the di-
versity of modern families, the ALI Principles allow for the pos-
sibility that a child might well have more than two parents at
any given time. Indeed, the only limitation imposed on the
number of parents is made with reference to practical consid-
erations in dividing the child's time, not with regard to any
norm of family construction.49
Furthermore, in allocating custodial roles among a child's
parents, the ALI Principles place the initial responsibility upon
the parents themselves to offer a parenting plan of their own
construction.50 Failing that, the Principles take as their chief
guide the past childrearing practices of the particular family
before the court, seeking as much as possible to approximate
and carry forward whatever pattern of childcare was estab-
lished before the family's dissolution.51 In this way, too, the
45. See ALI PRINCIPLES Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 32, § 2.03, at
37.
46. See, e.g., Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 16-20 (Mich. 1999) (holding
that a man who lived with, supported, and cared for children since their birth
in the mutually mistaken belief that he was their biological father is a "third
party" without standing to seek visitation or custody); Petersen v. Rogers, 445
S.E.2d 901, 906 (N.C. 1994) (holding that parents' fundamental right pre-
cludes custody claims by "strangers," including prospective adoptive parents
who had been rearing the child for an extended period).
47. See supra note 6.
48. For a discussion contrasting the treatment of such caregivers under
traditional family law and the ALI Principles, see David D. Meyer, What Con-
stitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, 2001
BYU L. REV. 1075.
49. See ALI PRINCIPLES Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 32, § 2.21(1)(b)
& cmt. b, at 376-80.
50. See id. § 2.06, at 64.
51. See id. § 2.09, at 108; Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st
Century: How the American Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability
and Still Protect the Individual Child's Best Interests, 35 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
467, 478-82 (1999). The ALI modeled its approximation standard on a pro-
posal made by Elizabeth Scott in a 1992 article in the California Law Review.
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ALI Principles are more sensitive to family variation and defer-
ential to individual preference than traditional approaches to
custody.52 Rather than using the custody decision as "an oppor-
tunity for restructuring parent-child relationships" 53 according
to some external family norm-the egalitarianism of joint cus-
tody, say, or whatever value judgments might infuse a trial
judge's best-interests determination-the goal of the ALI Prin-
ciples is to leave families as unaffected as possible by their en-
counter with the judiciary.54 Undergirding this approach to
custody, then, is a recognition that families come in many dif-
ferent forms and a judgment that the law's goal in most in-
stances should be affirming and strengthening families as they
exist rather than reforming them according to a fixed ideal. 55
B. THE TURN TOWARD TRADITION IN CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE
Against this backdrop of burgeoning public acceptance of
family diversity, the constitutional law of family privacy stands
as a comparative stalwart of tradition. From murky beginnings
in the substantive economic due process era of Lochner v. New
York, 56 the U.S. Supreme Court has fashioned a loose amalgam
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80
CAL. L. REV. 615 (1992).
52. See Scott, supra note 51, at 619 (asserting that "an approximation rule
[in custody cases] ... represents the optimal response to the current pluralism
in family structure"); id. at 633-37 (contending that "[a]lthough contemporary
families do not follow any single prescription regarding the allocation of par-
enting roles, the division of roles that a given couple adopts likely reflects in-
ternalized values and preferences").
53. Id. at 630.
54. See Bartlett, supra note 51, at 480; Scott, supra note 51, at 625-35.
55. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 809, 818, 851-52 (1998) (describing the ALI Principles as
"family-enabling" rather than "family-standardizing").
56. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The earliest of the modern family-privacy cases,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925)-both of which struck down legislation restricting parents'
educational choices for their children-appeared to rest at least in part on con-
cern for the freedom of contract between educators and parents. See Pierce,
268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400, 403; see also Troxel v. Gran-
ville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Meyer and
Pierce are rooted in "an era rich in substantive due process holdings that have
since been repudiated"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515-16 & n.7
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (characterizing Meyer and Pierce as cases vindi-
cating economic liberties); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53
VAND. L. REV. 527, 533-34 (2000) [hereinafter Meyer, Paradox]. Professor
Barbara Woodhouse has argued that Meyer and Pierce are best understood as
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of personal liberties relating to family life. These include the
right to marry,57 to procreate or to avoid procreation,58 to rear
children,59 and to cohabit with family members. 60 Together,
they are said to create "a 'private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter."61 Because these rights are considered fun-
damental,62 government incursions on these personal freedoms
are subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny.63
In deciding what sorts of conduct or decisionmaking fall
within the protected bounds of family privacy, the Court has
vindicating a sort of parental property right in children. See Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Prop-
erty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992).
57. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 384-85 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
58. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing a right to abortion); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 485-86 (recognizing a right to use contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (recognizing a right to avoid
sterilization).
59. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972);
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
60. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499-506 (1977).
61. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944)); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (quoting Prince).
62. The Supreme Court has denominated each of these rights to be "fun-
damental." See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)
("[We have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."); id. at 80 (Tho-
mas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the agreement of seven Justices
in Troxel that "parents have a fundamental constitutional right to rear their
children"); Turner, 482 U.S. at 95 ("[The decision to marry is a fundamental
right ... ."); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (acknowledging
that past cases recognize "a fundamental individual right to decide whether or
not to beget or bear a child"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)
(discussing "[tihe fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child[ren]"); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (de-
scribing the right to abortion as "fundamental").
63. At least since Casey, the Supreme Court has differentiated its review
in abortion cases from that applied in other family-privacy cases. Whereas
most incursions on family privacy are said to trigger the strict scrutiny typi-
cally applied in cases involving fundamental rights, Casey rejected the use of
strict scrutiny in abortion cases and instead adopted the less exacting "undue
burden" test. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, &
Souter, JJ.). I have argued elsewhere, however, that despite this nominal dif-
ferentiation, the Court has in fact followed an essentially similar, pragmatic
approach in all of the cases in which it determines that family-privacy rights
are burdened. See David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After
Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125 (2001) [hereinafter Meyer,
Lochner Redeemed]; Meyer, Paradox, supra note 56, at 536-54.
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not followed a single course. In some cases, it has classified
private choice as deserving of heightened constitutional protec-
tion on the ground that the choice carries unusually profound
ramifications for the decisionmakers. A woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy, for instance, was deemed protected
because the consequences of compelled childbirth and parent-
hood could be enormous;64 similarly, the decision of an interra-
cial couple to marry was brought within the scope of protection
on the ground that marriage is "essential to... happiness."65
In other cases, however, the Court has insisted that what
makes an intimate choice or relationship deserving of constitu-
tional protection is not its profound significance to the individ-
ual but whether society has long venerated personal autonomy
in making that choice. This is particularly true of the Court's
more recent cases. In Washington v. Glucksberg,66 for example,
the Court squarely rejected the claim that the Constitution en-
titled an individual to decide for himself whether to end his life
with the assistance of a physician. The personal stakes of this
decision, although concededly profound, 67 were not enough to
bring it within the realm of protected privacy; what mattered
was whether society had long considered such decisionmaking
as beyond the control of government (and the Court found that
it had not).68 The "crucial 'guideposts' for identifying the scope
of fundamental rights, the Court wrote, are "[o]ur Nation's his-
tory, legal traditions, and practices."69
The difference between these approaches has major impli-
cations for the extent to which the Constitution will protect un-
64. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (noting the
"unique" implications of the decision for the woman).
65. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at
204-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[We protect the decision whether to marry
precisely because marriage 'is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not com-
mercial social projects.) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)).
66. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
67. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990)
(acknowledging that "[tihe choice between life and death is a deeply personal
decision of obvious and overwhelming finality").
68. The Court explained, "That many of the rights and liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal deci-
sions are so protected.... " Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727.
69. Id. at 721 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,
125 (1992)).
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conventional family life. A focus on the stakes for the individ-
ual might well extend protection to new or socially disfavored
constructions of family life, as the Court was willing to do in
recognizing a right to marry across racial lines or while incar-
cerated.70 More often, however, the Court has emphasized
deeply rooted assumptions about the meaning of family as a
basis for denying protection to unconventional claimants. In
Bowers v. Hardwick,71 the Court found no constitutional protec-
tion for the choice to engage in homosexual conduct because so-
ciety had not long venerated that choice. Even if it were true,
as Justice Blackmun pointed out in dissent, that sexual inti-
macy is closely bound to the very process of self-definition, thus
making the state's imposition enormous, 72 what mattered to
the Court was that society had long and widely condemned this
sort of intimacy.73 In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,74 a plurality con-
cluded that the Constitution did not recognize as family the re-
lationship between a man and the daughter he sired during an
affair with the girl's married mother. Although the man had
intermittently lived with and helped to rear the child and had
established a loving bond with her, their relationship did not
enjoy "traditional respect in our society" and so lacked "any
constitutional significance."7 5
Even in cases in which the Court has ultimately upheld, or
at least reserved judgment on, claims of family privacy, it has
closely tied the Constitution's sense of "family" to traditional
understandings. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 6 the
Court found constitutional protection for the choice of a grand-
mother to share her home with one of her sons and two of her
grandchildren (one of whom had no parent residing in the
home) on the ground that society had long venerated extended-
family households, at least "in this degree of kinship."77 In do-
ing so, Justice Powell's plurality opinion distinguished a previ-
ous case, which had found no such protection for households
70. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (recognizing the right of a
prison inmate to marry); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (recognizing the right of an
interracial couple to marry).
71. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
72. See id. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 192-94; see also id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (em-
phasizing the history of Judeo-Christian condemnation of homosexuality).
74. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
75. Id. at 123 n.3.
76. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
77. Id. at 505-06.
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comprised of persons unrelated by blood, adoption, or marriage,
on the ground that society has demonstrated its "respect" for
extended biological families but not for unrelated cohabitants. 78
Finally, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal-
ity and Reform,79 the Court left open the possibility that the
Constitution might accord some protection to the relationship
between a child and her foster parents, but only after conclud-
ing that any such protection would be subordinated in prefer-
ence to the biological parent-child relationship. The foster fam-
ily could not be "dismiss[ed] ... as a mere collection of
unrelated individuals," the Court allowed.80 And yet, the lack
of a long tradition of societal veneration or any biological con-
nection meant that any constitutional status this "family-like
association"81 might enjoy would be "substantially attenuated"
when compared to that of the "natural" family.82 Justice Stew-
art, concurring in the judgment, was much less delicate in re-
jecting the foster parents' plea for preservation of their "fam-
fly," characterizing the bond between a child and foster parents
as essentially artificial.83
The Supreme Court's most recent case along these lines,
Troxel v. Granville,84 involved a mother's claim that the Consti-
tution prohibited the state from ordering, over her objection,
visitation between her children and their paternal grandpar-
ents. Because the state supreme court had ruled broadly that
parents are entitled to bar contact with all non-parents, unless
the severance would do the child "severe psychological harm,"8 5
the .case raised potentially far-reaching questions about just
what sort of "family" is valued by the Constitution.8 6 Would the
Constitution, for instance, favor the prerogative of a biological
parent even against a former partner who had played an equal
78. Id. at 498-500, 504 (distinguishing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
79. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
80. Id. at 844-45.
81. Id. at 846.
82. Id. at 846-47.
83. See id. at 857, 861-63 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
84. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
85. See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28-30 (Wash. 1998), affd sub
nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
86. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Case on Visitation Rights Hinges on De-fining Family, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000, at A14 (previewing the oral argument
in Troxel).
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role in raising the child?87 In a highly splintered decision, the
Justices carefully avoided most of these questions but were
quick to agree that society's longstanding regard for the parent-
child relationship at least required substantial deference for
the childrearing judgment of the parent.88
The occasional inconsistencies in the Court's approach
surely leave it some room to maneuver, but it is clear enough
that the Court's dominant methodology in the family-privacy
context strongly disfavors those who have an unpopular and
nontraditional conception of family. The Court's usual insis-
tence, especially in recent cases, that claimants find historical
veneration for their conception of family before it will be
deemed "deserving of constitutional recognition"8 9 is essentially
insurmountable for those who stray far from convention. Thus,
for example, although societal consensus appears to be moving
toward recognizing that the same-sex couples have a legitimate
claim to be regarded as family (even if not on equal terms with
traditional families),90 a gay or lesbian couple is not likely to be
able to claim constitutional protection for their family choices
under an approach that emphasizes tradition.91 No matter how
87. See, e.g., LaChappelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1011 (2000) (upholding an order granting co-parenting
rights to former partner in same-sex relationship in a case decided shortly be-
fore Troxel was handed down). For a discussion of how such a case might be
decided after Troxel, see David D. Meyer, Constitutional Pragmatism for a
Changing American Family, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 711, 728-31 (2001) [hereinafter
Meyer, Constitutional Pragmatism].
88. The fact that the constitutional claimant in that case was a biological
and legal parent who fell squarely within traditional conceptions of family ul-
timately permitted the Court to avoid knottier questions of constitutional
definition. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the author of the plurality opinion
in Troxel, suggested in public comments after the case was handed down that
the Constitution's protection for family life is rooted in tradition and in "com-
mon understandings of the family," a formula which might imply little room
for deviant conceptions of family life. See Sandra Day O'Connor, The Supreme
Court and the Family, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 575 (2001) (observing that in
its family-privacy cases, "the Court has spoken of our common understandings
of the family, our common aspirations, and the need to have a deeper under-
standing of the values that lie at the heart of our tradition"). At the same
time, both in Troxel and in her later remarks, Justice O'Connor emphasized
the need for constitutional law to be adaptive to "the 'changing realities of the
American family.'" Id. at 577-78 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64). Troxel itself
more acknowledges this dilemma than seeks to resolve it. See Meyer, Consti-
tutional Pragmatism, supra note 87, at 719-22.
89. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
90. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
91. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
20021 809
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sincerely or powerfully these individuals might regard one an-
other as "family," no matter what role their intimacy may oc-
cupy in their lives, the lack of longstanding social acceptance
will likely defeat their claim. And, importantly, the reason for
this defeat is likely not to be the demonstration of any excep-
tional interest by the state but a threshold determination that
the subjects of the state's regulation simply do not constitute a
"family"-or at least not any family worthy of constitutional
"respect."92
II. THE STATIC NATURE OF "FAMILY" IN
UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION: COMPARISONS
WITH RELIGION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In evaluating the Court's heavily traditionalist approach to
defining "family," it is illuminating to contrast the Court's ap-
proach to defining "religion" for purposes of the First Amend-
ment's guarantees of religious liberty. 93 The Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, like the more amorphous guarantees of
family privacy, confer fundamental individual rights in a zone
of profound personal significance. And, just as courts must con-
front the dilemma of deciding what notions of "family" qualify
for constitutional protection, so too the First Amendment ines-
capably requires courts to define the boundaries of "religion."
The Court's understanding of "religion," however, has been
strikingly more expansive and fluid than its conception of "fam-
dissenting); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 392 (1978) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); id. at 398-99 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment);
Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995) (finding no right,
under state constitution's due process guarantee, to same-sex marriage be-
cause society has not traditionally recognized such a right); Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44, 55-57 (Haw. 1993) (same); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1. But cf
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 24 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2015, 2017
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding that a ban on same-sex marriage
infringed the constitutional right of privacy because society has long honored
intimate self-definition).
92. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 & n.3 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion); Moore, 431 U.S. at 504.
93. Martha Minow first suggested such an alnalogy a decade ago in a lec-
ture at the University of Illinois College of Law. See Minow, Free Exercise of
Families, supra note 19, at 934-37; see also COTT, supra note 25, at 212-13.
Although Professor Minow allowed that she considered the comparison "a
bit... wacky," Minow, Free Exercise of Families, supra note 19 at 935, this
Author believes it is ultimately quite compelling and attempts here to offer a
somewhat more complete demonstration of its relevance than was possible
within the confines of Professor Minow's lecture.
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ily."
Originally, the Supreme Court cabined "religion" in much
the same way in which it now limits the scope of protected fam-
fly life. The "religion" valued by the First Amendment, the
Court then asserted, was the sort of theistic belief widely rec-
ognized and long revered by mainstream America-and noth-
ing more. "The term 'religion,"' the Court wrote in 1890, "has
reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to
the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and char-
acter, and of obedience to his will."94 Conceptions of religious
life that strayed from this tradition could not claim protec-
tion.95 Thus, in a succession of cases toward the end of the
Nineteenth Century, the Court placed Mormons effectively out-
side the scope of protected religion, in much the same way the
Court today might be expected to place polygamy outside the
protected range of family life.9 6 The polygamy then practiced
as part of the Mormon faith could claim no respect from tradi-
tional American values; to the contrary, the Court asserted, the
practice was associated only with cultures considered alien to
the American tradition and had "always been odious among the
northern and western nations of Europe."97 "To call their advo-
cacy [of polygamy] a tenet of religion," the Court summed up
94. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); see also Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (declaring that '[w]e are a religious people whose in-
stitutions presuppose a Supreme Being"); United States v. Macintosh, 283
U.S. 605, 625 (1931) ("We are a Christian people, according to one another the
equal right of religious freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty of
obedience to the will of God."), overruled in part by Girouard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61 (1946); id. at 633-34 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (defining religion
as resting upon "belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation").
95. See 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.7, at 532 (1992)
("The claims of religious minorities received little serious attention from the
Supreme Court through the first part of this century."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 1179 (2d ed. 1988) ("In order to be
considered legitimate, religions had to be viewed as 'civilized' by Western
standards.").
96. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 46 (1890) (upholding the repeal of the Mormon
Church charter); Davis, 133 U.S. at 342 (upholding an Idaho law barring
polygamists from serving as electors); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
168 (1878) (upholding a conviction for bigamy).
97. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. The strength of popular revulsion to Mor-
mon polygamy at the time is well described in Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peay's
Horses: The Federal Response to Mormon Polygamy, 1854-1887, 13 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 29 (2001).
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bluntly, "is to offend the common sense of mankind," or at least
that portion of mankind respected by mainstream American
tradition.98
The Court's narrow, traditionalist conception of "religion"
began to give way, however, midway through the Twentieth
Century, following a period of dramatic diversification of
American religious life. 99 The early years of that century
brought the first large-scale immigration of non-Christian be-
lievers into the United States,100 and subsequent decades ush-
ered in the rise of numerous non-theistic faiths.10 By 1944, the
Court insisted that the First Amendment valued unorthodox
faiths as well as conventional religion: "[F]reedom of religious
belief," the Court wrote in United States v. Ballard, "embraces
the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the
hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox
faiths." 0 2 By 1961, the Court felt compelled to broaden the
Constitution's regard for "religion" beyond theistic faith alto-
gether and to acknowledge the presence of "religions in this
country which do not teach what would generally be considered
98. Davis, 133 U.S. at 341-42; see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 49-50 (stating that Mormon adherence
to polygamy was but a "pretence" by the understanding of "the enlightened
sentiment of mankind").
99. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001). Writing in the late
1980s, Laurence Tribe observed that "[in colonial times there were dozens of
major religious groups; today there are well over 250 recognized, major
churches, and this number does not include hundreds of smaller, 'fringe'
groups." TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1179 (footnotes omitted). By the mid-1990s,
it was "estimated that more than eight hundred organized religions have ap-
peared in North America during [the Twentieth] [Clentury." JESSE H.
CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 67 n.52 (1995) (citing J. Gordon
Melton, Another Look at New Religions, 527 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 97 (May 1993)). Writing in 2001, a leading researcher concluded,
Today, over half of all the 2000-plus primary religious groups operat-
ing in the United States were formed after 1960. And lest we think of
this as a problem at the fringe, we note that of the six largest reli-
gious bodies in the United States, three of them were formed in that
time period.
J. Gordon Melten, Religious Pluralism: Problems and Prospects, 2001 BYU L.
REV. 619, 621 [hereinafter Melton, Religious Pluralism].
100. See Melton, Religious Pluralism, supra note 99, at 620-21; Eduardo
Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 796 & n.30 (1997).
101. See TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1180 (noting a "shift in religious thought
from a theocentric, transcendental perspective to forms of religious conscious-
ness that stress the immanence of meaning in the natural order").
102. 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
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a belief in the existence of God." 10 3
The Court's view of religion expanded still farther in a pair
of cases interpreting the scope of "religious belief' that would
confer an exemption from combat service during the Vietnam
War. In United States v. Seeger,1°4 the Court held that the ex-
emption could not be limited, as the selective service statute
seemed to require, to those who subscribed to a theistic faith.10 5
Instead, the Court concluded that "religious belief' must in-
clude any "belief that is sincere and meaningful" that "occupies
a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God."106
In subsequent cases, the Court appears to have retreated
somewhat from the most expansive implications of Seeger's
functional approach to defining religion. In Wisconsin v.
Yoder,107 for instance, the Court notably went out of its way to
distinguish the theology of the Old Order Amish from purely
"philosophical and personal" belief systems, which would not
103. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (striking down a
state requirement that public officials attest to a belief in God). The Court
suggested that these "religions" included "Buddhism, Taosim, Ethical Culture,
Secular Humanism and others." Id.
104. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
105. See id. at 187-88. The selective service statute provided a combat ex-
emption to those whose "religious training and belief were incompatible with
participation in the war. The statute then defined "religious training and be-
lief' as turning on "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." Universal
Military Training & Serv. Act, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 6(j), 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(62 Stat.) 612, 613.
106. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166; see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
341 (1970) (applying Seeger formulation); Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176, 184. Al-
though Seeger and Welsh were nominally construing the terms of the selective
service statute, the Court strongly suggested that this understanding of"relig-
ion" carried over to the First Amendment as well. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176;
id. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Relig-
ion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 589 (understanding
Seeger as "hav[ing] significant constitutional portents, particularly because
the Court's straining of the language of the statute.., was prompted by its
desire to '[avoid] imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious
beliefs, exempting some and excluding others'"); Donald A. Giannella, Reli-
gious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I, The Reli-
gious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1425 (1967); Kent
Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753,
760-61 (1984); Robert L. Rabin, When Is a Religious Belief Religious: United
States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231, 238
(1966).
107. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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qualify for protection under the Free Exercise Clause.108 How
much of a retreat this constituted is debatable. In Seeger, too,
the Court had excluded from "religion" beliefs that were "essen-
tially political, sociological, or philosophical views."109 Still, as
Justice Douglas pointed out in dissent in Yoder, Henry Tho-
reau's beliefs would seem to qualify as "religious" under See-
ger's functional approach. 110 Importantly, however, the Court
has given no inkling of returning to a definition that ties consti-
tutional protection to tradition or conventional acceptance.
Instead, the Court has committed itself to a broad under-
standing of religion, but has avoided drawing the boundaries of
First Amendment protection tightly around any single defini-
tion of religion. In the view of some, the Court has been pre-
cisely right to leave the concept murky and open-ended."' And
among the many who have ventured to offer some definition or
methodology to fill the void, none would have constitutional
status turn on the ability of a sect or belief system to claim
wide-scale social acceptance or historical respect. Some, for ex-
ample, have urged a definition that encompasses each individ-
ual's "ultimate concern"; 12 others have sought to distill the es-
108. The Court wrote,
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be [counted
as "religion"] ... if it is based on purely secular considerations; to
have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted
in religious belief.... Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims be-
cause of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary
secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected
the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond,
their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does
not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
Id. at 215-16.
109. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
110. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 247-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); see also
TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1182-83 (finding conflict between the understandings
of religion in Seeger and Yoder); Choper, supra note 106, at 590-91 (suggesting
that Yoder's "relatively cautious approach" to defining religion appeared to re-
treat from Seeger); Pefialver, supra note 100, at 798-99 (same).
111. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illu-
sions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 266, 298 (1987).
112. See M. Elisabeth Bergeron, Note, "New Age" or New Testament?: To-
ward a More Faithful Interpretation of "Religion", 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 365,
375-78 (1995); Craig A. Mason, Comment, "Secular Humanism" and the Defi-
nition of Religion: Extending a Modified "Ultimate Concern" Test to Mozert v.
Hawkins County Public Schools and Smith v. Board of School Commissioners,
63 WASH. L. REV. 445 (1988); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Re-
ligion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1056 (1978). Similarly, the U.S. Court of Ap-
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sence of religion as the presence of "faith"113 or a belief in "ex-
tra-temporal consequences" or, perhaps, in a "transcendent re-
ality";114 still others have argued that no single definition can
possibly capture all that is worthy of protection and have urged
instead that courts proceed pragmatically to "decide whether
something is religious by comparison with the indisputably re-
ligious, in light of the particular legal problem involved."'15
In all, the range of approaches proposed by scholars or
tested in court opinions demonstrates a powerful modern con-
sensus that "religion" must be understood in a way that allows
considerable room for individual self-definition. It is widely ac-
cepted that the Court was correct to broaden its understanding
of religion to account for the exploding diversity of religious life
in the Twentieth Century, and that any constitutional test
must allow for the emergence of new conceptions of religious
belief in the future.1 16 This is not, of course, to say that defer-
peals for the Second Circuit, borrowing from William James, defined religion
as 'the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may
consider the divine.'" United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir.
1983) (quoting WILLIAMi JAAIES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31
(1910)).
113. See generally Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the Constitutional Defini-
tion of Religion, 22 CLMB. L. REV. 1 (1991-92).
114. See Choper, supra note 106, at 597-604; see also Mason, supra note
112, at 446 (proposing a focus on belief in a "non-rational, transcendent real-
ity"). Dean Choper ultimately rejects a "transcendental reality" test in favor of
an "extratemporal consequences" test. See CHOPER, supra note 99, at 74-85;
Choper, supra note 106, at 604.
115. Greenawalt, supra note 106, at 753; see also George C. Freeman III,
The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion", 71 GEO.
L.J. 1519, 1520 (1983); Pefialver, supra note 100, at 795. At least two federal
courts of appeals, most prominently led by Judge Arlin Adams on the Third
Circuit, have developed such an approach. See United States v. Meyers, 95
F.3d 1475, 1483-84 (10th Cir. 1996) (construing the scope of religion protected
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Africa v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1034-35 (3d Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d
197, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (Adams, J., concurring in the result);
see also Church of the Chosen People v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 1247,
1251 (D. Minn. 1982). A decision of the High Court of Australia has taken a
similar approach. See Greenawalt, supra note 106, at 775 n.86 (discussing the
Justices' opinions in The Church of the New Faith v. Commissioner for Payroll
Tax (Oct. 27, 1983)).
116. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1180-81 ("These changed circum-
stances [the diversification of religious life] made it all but inevitable that the
Supreme Court would modify the narrow understanding of 'religion' that had
characterized the early development of the law. The idea of religious liberty-
combined with the special place of religion in the constitutional order-
demands a definition of 'religion' that goes beyond the closely bounded limits
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ence to the individual is total, or that the constitutional concept
of "religion" is unbounded. It is clear that the state must be
permitted to inquire into the sincerity of religious claims117 and
to measure even sincere claims against some external standard
of what makes religion distinctive or valuable. 118 The salient
point is that this inquiry must leave substantial room for un-
conventional conceptions of religion, at least so long as they
bear some resemblance to concepts readily recognized and long
valued as religious by conventional understanding.
III. EVALUATING THE DIVERGENCE IN THE COURTS
APPROACHES: CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES AND
SOURCES OF MEANING
The Court's approach to defining "religion" suggests the
possibility of a very different model for resolving the threshold
question of "family" in constitutional privacy analysis. Perhaps
the Court's recognition of the propriety of flexibility and defer-
ence in giving content to "religion" supports a similar role for
self-definition in the concept of "family." Perhaps, borrowing
from the definitional approaches that have been proposed in
the context of the Religion Clauses, the courts might extend
constitutional protection beyond convention to any sincere con-
struction of family relationships that serves the essential func-
tion of traditional family or bears a sufficient resemblance to
indisputable forms of family.
Any proposal to borrow from First Amendment doctrine,
however, must first take account of real differences between
the respective constitutional guarantees. The guarantees of re-
of theism, and accounts for the multiplying forms of recognizably legitimate
religious exercise."); Choper, supra note 106, at 580 (stating that any constitu-
tional definition of religion "should be sufficiently capable of growth to include
new, unusual, and nonconformist sects and beliefs as well as traditional
ones"); Pefialver, supra note 100, at 795-96.
117. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
118. Cf Minow, Free Exercise of Families, supra note 19, at 936, 940-41
(implying that the only limitation on constitutional free-exercise protection is
the sincerity of the claimant's belief). As Yoder makes explicit, there is ulti-
mately some outer limit to the constitutional concept of religion. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972); see supra note 108; see also Greenawalt,
supra note 106, at 755 n.7 ("Although the two are sometimes conflated, the
question of sincerity is separable from the question of religiousness.... Ordi-
narily a free exercise claim must be both religious and sincere to qualify for
constitutional protection."). As suggested below, that limit most likely corre-
sponds with a generous reading of modern convention about what counts as
religion. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
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ligious freedom, for one thing, are enumerated in the text of the
Constitution whereas rights of family privacy are not. More-
over, the Court's more expansive understanding of "religion"
might be supported by underlying theories or values unique to
the First Amendment or at least inapplicable in the context of
family privacy. Whatever differences there are between the
purposes and natures of these constitutional guarantees, how-
ever, do not justify the full scale of divergence currently found
in the Court's approach.
A. FAMILY PRIVACY AS AN UNENUMERATED RIGHT
For some, the prominent role of history and convention in
the Supreme Court's definition of family might be justified on
the ground that the rights of family privacy have no clear roots
in constitutional text. In contrast to the First Amendment's
explicit reference to religion, the word "family" does not appear
in the Constitution. Over time, the Court or individual Justices
have made occasional efforts to trace one or more of the family-
privacy interests to a particular strand of text, including the
Ninth Amendment, 19 the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,1 20 and (most often) the Due Proc-
ess Clauses.121 No one, however, has taken these efforts very
seriously.122
119. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (suggesting the relevance of the Ninth Amendment to finding a
fundamental right of married couples to use contraception).
120. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 n.* (2000) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (suggesting the possibility that the fundamental right of
parents to rear their children might be grounded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Privileges and Immunities Clause).
12L See, e.g., id. at 66 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("[It cannot now be
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, cus-
tody, and control of their children."); id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). For a discussion of
the various possible ways of understanding the source and nature of the con-
stitutional rights recognized in the Meyer and Pierce cases, see, for example,
Meyer, Paradox, supra note 56, at 533-35.
122. Indeed, the Court itself has sometimes been quite frank in acknowl-
edging its uncertainty about the nature or origins of these rights, even as it
has reaffirmed and applied them. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 847-50 (1992) (conceding that the Courts Due Process protection of
"the substantive sphere of liberty" is not the product of textual interpretation
and ultimately defies any "expression as a simple rule"); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 178 n.15 (1976) (admitting uncertainty about whether "[tihe
Meyer-Pierce-Yoder 'parental' right and the privacy right" emerging from cases
such as Griswold and Roe were theoretically distinct or merely "verbal varia-
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In a series of prominent cases the Supreme Court has
looked to history and tradition as means of validating its en-
forcement of fundamental rights that cannot be located in con-
stitutional text.123 That society has long and widely viewed a
given state action as beyond the appropriate power of govern-
ment gives some reassurance that unelected judges, striking
down the action without textual authorization, have not merely
imposed their own will in preference to that of the political ma-
jority. Although it is widely accepted that history and tradition
are relevant to any determination of the scope of nontextual
rights, the precise role that these factors should play is fa-
mously contested. 124 Among other points of contention, there
is, as yet, no consensus on the level of generality or specificity
with which a practice should be described when turning to his-
torical consensus for evidence of veneration. 125
tions of a single constitutional right"); see also, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding no basis for "bWudicial vindication of 'parental
rights' under a Constitution that does not even mention them"); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
123. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (identi-
fying "[olur Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices" as the "crucial
'guideposts'" for marking the boundaries of substantive due process) (quoting
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-95 (1986); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977) (asserting that "the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). See generally Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitu-
tionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173.
124. There are different views on the subject. See, e.g., City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 n.20 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (suggesting
that a fundamental right might be found notwithstanding a long tradition of
government interference with the practice); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 756-69
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that historical support is
relevant, but not essential); Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (contending that historical vali-
dation is essential).
125. Cf, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 & n.6 (1989)
(Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (suggesting that the Constitution protects only
those practices, which defined at "the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition.., can be identified," would have found protection in longstanding
societal consensus); id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (acknowledg-
ing that the narrow "mode of historical analysis [advocated in Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion] ... may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in
this area"); id. at 137-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally LAURENCE H.
TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTTUTION 73-80 (1991).
Recently, in Glucksberg, the only guidance a majority of the Court apparently
could agree on was that the practice should be "carefully formulat[ed]," what-
ever that might mean. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722; see also id. at 721 (requir-
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Yet, however these points might be resolved in other con-
texts, the nontextual status of family privacy does not persua-
sively support the wide divergence in the Supreme Court's
definitional approaches to "family" and "religion." Although
"religion" does appear in the text of the First Amendment,
there is no plausible claim that the Court's currently expansive
understanding of that term is controlled by the text. To the
contrary, it is accepted that the Court's current approach to de-
fining the boundaries of religious liberty is largely a product of
recent decades. 126 Given the Court's extension of constitutional
protection to embodiments of "religion" that were clearly be-
yond the contemplation of the First Amendment's framers, 127
and indeed given the Court's reluctance in case after case to
give any particular content to the word,128 it is problematic to
ing a "careful description" of the right) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
302 (1993)).
126. See RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 161
(1972) ("It is fair to say of the majority of the Warren Court that in the free-
exercise area a diffuse desire to protect unorthodox minorities led it, helter-
skelter, into a major doctrinal innovation. The free-exercise clause has now
grown far beyond the confines of Reynolds." (citing Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878)); Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1709, 1712-13 (2000) [hereinafter Choper, Religious Freedom]
("Surprising as it may seem, the last hundred years tell nearly the entire story
of the federal judiciary's role in America's experiments with the Religion
Clauses.... It was not until the 1940s that the Court gradually began to give
the concepts of religious freedom and separation of church and state the more
vigorous meaning that we generally associate with them today."); Mary Ann
Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477,
480-82 (1991); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 99.
127. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 99, at 5 ("At least in part because our
nation has become far more religiously heterogeneous, 'practices which may
have been objectionable to no one in the time of Jefferson and Madison may
today be highly offensive to ... the deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike.'")
(quoting Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring)); Choper, Religious Freedom, supra note 126, at 1712 ("Even if the Fram-
ers' intent were clear and unambiguous-and it was not-they could not have
imagined the remarkable religious heterogeneity that is today a commonplace
feature of American life, or the demands that its 'free exercise' might place
upon the fabric of society.") (footnote omitted); Pefialver, supra note 100, at
803 & n.91 (noting that "an exclusive reliance on original intent would man-
date the adoption of the Framers' theistic definition of religion" and quoting
James Madison's definition of religion as 'the duty which we owe to our Crea-
tor and the Manner of discharging it") (quoting James Madison, To the Hon-
orable the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia. A Memorial
and Remonstrance., in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 6, 7 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981)).
128. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 973 (1997) (noting that "the Supreme Court never has formu-
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credit the text with a great deal of legitimating power. 129
With regard to religion, however, there is now a powerful
consensus, both on and off the Supreme Court, that the First
Amendment should be construed to protect not only those
faiths that the Framers would have recognized as religious, but
also modern belief systems that serve the same function or bear
a sufficient "family resemblance" 130 to those traditional faiths.
It is enough, by this consensus, that the text provides valida-
tion for judicial protection of "religion" at a general level, leav-
ing to the courts of future generations the task of adapting the
specific content of that term to keep pace with ongoing changes
in contemporary conceptions of religious life. If history and
tradition are meant as a substitute for text in performing this
validating function, then this consensus might suggest the pro-
priety, in the context of family privacy, of permitting courts
similar leeway in expanding the "family" comprehended by the
Constitution: Deeply rooted tradition provides validation for
judicial protection of "family" at a general level, leaving room
for courts to adapt the specific content of that term to the rap-
idly changing terrain of contemporary family life.
lated a definition of religion"); 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 95, § 21.6, at
528-29 ("he Supreme [Clourt has not attempted to define religion although it
has noted that any exemptions that the judiciary created under the free exer-
cise clause would be limited to persons asserting a religious belief."); TRIBE,
supra note 95, at 1187 (observing that "courts have largely avoided defining
'religion' under the establishment clause"); Choper, supra note 106, at 579
(stating that "the Supreme Court has never seriously discussed how this term
["religion"] should be defined for constitutional purposes"); Rebecca Redwood
French, From Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional, Modern, and Postmodern
Religion in U.S. Constitutional Law, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 50-52 & n.13 (1999)
(noting that "[iun its religion clause jurisprudence, the Court understandably
has been reluctant to provide all-inclusive definitions of religion not tailored to
the immediate context of the case before it" and that, in fact, "the Court has
avoided defining religion") (citations omitted); Smith, supra note 111, at 298.
129. Indeed, Steven Smith argues cogently that the Supreme Coures mod-
ern religious-liberty jurisprudence departs so far from text and original under-
standing that it amounts to an effective repeal of the religion clauses. See
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 49-50 (1995). He con-
tends that the religion clauses were purely jurisdictional," stripping the fed-
eral government of any role in addressing thorny questions of religious aid or
establishment and leaving them wholly to the political judgment of the states.
In his view, then, any effort to derive a substantive principle of religious free-
dom from the text of the First Amendment is wholly artificial. See id. at 45-
55.
130. E.g., Greenawalt, supra note 106, at 763; Pefialver, supra note 100, at
821.
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B. LOOKING TO THE VALUES UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION: THE PLACE OF NEUTRALITY, PLURALISM, AND
AUTONOMY
Even if family privacy's source outside the text of the Con-
stitution does not require the divergence in the Court's ap-
proaches to defining "religion" and "family," it remains to con-
sider whether differences in the purposes of the respective
constitutional guarantees might justify the divide.
At a superficial level, at least, there are striking similari-
ties between religion and family in the constitutional scheme.
Both are often said to occupy a "private sphere" outside of the
public order,131 and both are widely presumed to play crucial
formative roles in the development of the individual and in the
transmission of the foundational values upon which society is
built. 132 Indeed, the two "spheres" are often assumed to be
overlapping, with families serving as the primary conduits for
the transmission of religious faith.133 It is therefore not at all
surprising that several of the Supreme Court's most prominent
131. For the conception of religion in a private sphere, see, for example,
TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1226, observing that "[tihe doctrines that prohibit ex-
cessive church-state entanglement reflect the Madisonian concern that secular
and religious authorities must not interfere with each other's respective
spheres of choice and influence," French, supra note 128, at 69 & n.107, and
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 99. For the conception of family in a private
sphere, see, for example, Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498-1502 (1983),
and Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV.
1135, 1157. Indeed, the family has been directly likened to "a little church"
for the way it occupies a self-governed sphere separate from the state. See
Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 541 (quoting John Demos, Images of the Ameri-
can Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 43, 46 (Vir-
ginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979)).
132. The Supreme Court, for instance, has observed that "[iut is through
the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished val-
ues, moral and cultural." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-
04 (1977); see also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888); Murphy v. Ram-
sey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (asserting that "a free, self-governing common-
wealth... [must be] establish[ed] ... on the basis of the idea of the family");
DEREK H. DAVIS, RELIGION AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at
186-88, 192-95 (2000) (describing the framers' views about the primacy of re-
ligion and family "to the development of both individual virtue and the larger
political order"). Social science literature likewise demonstrates that "family
relationships ... play a powerful role in shaping adult prospects" of children.
Garrison, supra note 23, at 261 & n.109 (citations omitted).
133. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (stating that "Itihe
Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual,
the family, and the institutions of private choice"); DAVIS, supra note 132, at
186-87 (discussing the role of families in the transmission of religious values).
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landmarks in this area-starting with Meyer and Pierce, and
continuing on through Yoder134-have involved intertwined
claims of religious freedom and family privacy. 35
In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court's ex-
pansive approach to defining "religion" is clearly supported by
the norms animating the modern understanding of the Religion
Clauses. There remains lively debate over whether the central
premise of those Clauses should be understood to be state neu-
trality toward all things religious or an affirmative recognition
of the special value of religion.136 The clause specially guaran-
teeing the "free exercise" of religion suggests the latter under-
standing, although the clause forbidding a state "establish-
ment" of religion might be seen as endorsing the former. In
fact, there is a substantial historical claim that the Establish-
ment Clause, limited as it was to the actions of "Congress,"137
was originally meant to ensure only the neutrality of the na-
tional government, leaving individual states free to decide for
themselves whether to adopt an official religion within their ju-
134. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding the claim of
Amish parents to an exemption from a law mandating secondary schooling);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (involving the prosecution of a
guardian for enlisting a child's aid in street corner proselytizing); Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a law mandating universal
public education unconstitutionally interfered with the right of parents to
choose to educate their children in a Catholic school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (involving the prosecution of a teacher in a Lutheran school for
giving religious instruction in German). For a discussion of the way in which
Meyer, now considered the foundational case of family privacy, was also cen-
trally a case vindicating religious liberty, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD
MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 325-26 (2001). To this list
might also be added the Court's cases dealing with laws penalizing polygamy,
although they predate the modern development of family-privacy doctrine and
therefore involved only claims of religious freedom. See Late Corp. of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
(1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878).
135. As these cases demonstrate, a recurring point of overlap is the claim of
parents to control the religious upbringing of their children. For fuller discus-
sion of the complexities presented by entangled claims of religious and family
prerogative, see, for example, JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS VS.
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998), Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 53 (1999), and Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A
Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996).
136. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 132, at 10-14; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note
99.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ").
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risdictions. 138 Nevertheless, neutrality has emerged as a pow-
erful, and indeed the dominant, concern in the modern under-
standing of both Clauses. 139 Although neutrality has several
meanings in this context, the core principle claiming universal
adherence is that government must not play favorites among
competing conceptions of religious life.140 Even those who
138. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA
93-95 (1987); DAVIS, supra note 132, at 16-17, 26, 224-25; SMITH, supra note
129, at 21-22; Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establish-
ment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1132-33 (1988); Jeffries & Ryan, supra
note 99.
139. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2104
(2001) ("[WMe have held that 'a significant factor in upholding governmental
programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality to-
wards religion.') (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (emphasis added by the Court in Good News Club));
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (declaring that "we have consis-
tently turned to the principle of neutrality" in deciding the permissibility of
government aid to religious schools); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) ("[Wle have often stated the principle
that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a par-
ticular religion or of religion in general."); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60
(1985) ("[It is an] established principle that the government must pursue a
course of complete neutrality toward religion."); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) ("A proper respect for
both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to
pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion."); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("In the relationship between man and religion, the State
is firmly committed to a position of neutrality."); see also SMITH, supra note
129, at 77 (describing "neutrality" as "[plerhaps the most pervasive theme in
modern judicial and academic discourse on the subject of religious freedom");
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 99.
140. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 547 ("Legisla-
tors may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or
oppress a religion or its practices."); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-45
(1982). Commentators explain various conceptions of neutrality at play in the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Religion Clauses. See, e.g., Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 560-63 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); SMITH, supra note 129, at 77-96; TRIBE, supra
note 95, § 14-7, at 1188-94; Mary Anne Case, Lessons for the Future of Af-
firmative Action from the Past of the Religion Clauses?, 2000 SUP. CT. REV.
325, 334 (finding in the Court's cases a concern for neutrality not only among
religions or between religion generally and non-religion, but also "between re-
ligion and other bases for inclusion or selection for governmentally provided
opportunities"); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); Douglas Laycock,
The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997).
For the argument that the Court's quest for "neutrality" is ultimately futile
because the decision to privilege any particular conception of religious freedom
necessarily precludes or disadvantages competing conceptions, see SMITH, su-
pra note 129, at 63-97. See also 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 95, § 21.6,
at 528 ("It is difficult to see how the Supreme Court could define religion in a
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would downplay the importance of neutrality toward religion
readily acknowledge the obligation of neutrality among relig-
ions. 141 As the Court observed in Larson v. Valente, this policy
unites the First Amendment's twin promises of religious lib-
erty: 'The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is
that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred
over another.... Free exercise.., can be guaranteed only
when legislators-and voters-are required to accord to their
own religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or
unpopular denominations."142
Implicit in this norm of neutrality is, of course, a high
value on religious pluralism. This value is implicit in the origi-
nal understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, and even more
vividly reflected in the expansion of First Amendment doctrine
during the last half-century corresponding with the diversifica-
tion of religious life.143
An additional and related value underlying the First
Amendment's protection of religious freedom is respect for the
autonomy of the individual in a realm thought to "have a
unique significance for the believer."144 The Religion Clauses
manner that would not involve the governmental punishment of beliefs or the
granting of a denominational preference.").
141. See SMITH, supra note 129, at 124 ("Our history speaks with conflict-
ing voices on the question whether government should 'aid' religion, but it may
convincingly support the idea that government should not recognize any par-
ticular denomination as the official state church, or that government should
not require, or forbid, participation in particular religio[us] movements.").
142. 456 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1982); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687, 703 (1994) (observing that it is "a principle at the heart of the Establish-
ment Clause, that government should not prefer one religion to another");
CHOPER, supra note 99, at 13 ("In the main, [the Free Exercise Clause] pre-
vents the state from impeding the practices of religious minorities that are ei-
ther disfavored or unacknowledged by the majority."); Akbil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1159 (1991) (noting that
the Free Exercise Clause "was specially concerned with the plight of minority
religions"); Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward
a Unified Theory of First Amendment Exemptions From Neutral Laws of Gen-
eral Applicability, 66 Mo. L. REV. 9, 29-30 (2001).
143. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1516 (1990) [hereinafter
McConnell, Origins of Free Exercise] (contending that "[tihe Madisonian per-
spective points toward pluralism... as the organizing principle of church-
state relations").
144. Choper, supra note 106, at 597; see also CHOPER, supra note 99, at 74;
J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327,
337 (1969) (describing respect for the special significance of religious con-
science as perhaps the strongest policy underlying the Free Exercise Clause);
Pefialver, supra note 100, at 807 ("The ability of religions to fulfill a deeply
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thus protect "the sanctity of religious conscience" 145 partly be-
cause of the profound importance of religious belief to many in-
dividuals and the sense that it would be "particularly cruel for
the government to require the believer to choose between vio-
lating those commands and suffering meaningful temporal dis-
abilities." 146
These underlying values provide strong and obvious sup-
port for the Supreme Court's expansive view of what consti-
tutes "religion." Parsing the concept narrowly risks favoring
some sects and withholding protection from others. That re-
sult, of course, would compromise the government's neutrality
and undermine the associated value given religious pluralism;
it also would expose disfavored believers not only to the conse-
quences of unchecked state regulation, but also to the insult of
official categorization of their faith as something less than a
genuine religion. Accordingly, the policies supporting religious
freedom require that the state allow considerable latitude for
individuals to develop and act upon their own sincere concep-
tions of religious devotion and expression, however
"[un] acceptable" or even "[in]comprehensible" these may appear
by conventional standards. 147 It is for these reasons that the
Supreme Court quite properly "has emphasized the believer's
own perspective" in assessing claims of religious belief and the
constitutional scope of "religion."148
The policies giving rise to the Constitution's protection of
family privacy are murkier and more contested, but there are
ready parallels to the law of religious liberty.149 Just as the
Constitution values autonomy in religious life-marking out a
rooted human longing makes them particularly precious and worthy of protec-
tion.").
145. TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1236.
146. Choper, supra note 106, at 597 (emphasis added); see also id. at 598
(stating that "intuition and experience affirm that the degree of internal
trauma" is greater for one forced to violate religious scruples than for one
forced to violate a merely moral scruple); Clark, supra note 144, at 337 (assert-
ing that "[tihe violation of a man's religion or conscience often works an excep-
tional harm to him" and that "the cost to a principled individual of failing to do
his moral duty is generally severe, in terms of supernatural sanction or the
loss of moral self-respect").
147. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
148. TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1181 ("[ln order to realize the goals of reli-
gious liberty, 'religion' must be defined broadly enough to recognize the in-
creasing number and diversity of faiths. Furthermore, 'religion' must be de-
fined from the believer's perspective.").
149. See Minow, Free Exercise of Families, supra note 19, at 936.
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"sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment... to reserve from all official control"' 50-so
the guarantees of family privacy are intended to ensure auton-
omy in a "private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter."151 Although these assertions of the state's absolute ex-
clusion are seriously overstated in both contexts, they illustrate
well the common value given to individual autonomy. In the
area of family life, as in the realm of religion, the Court often
has explained the Constitution's solicitude by pointing to the
profound importance of family relationships to the individuals
involved and the enormous imposition that state regulation
would entail.152
There is also support for a policy of neutrality in the Con-
stitution's protection of family privacy, though it is more quali-
fied than in the context of religious liberty. It is most assuredly
difficult, as Professor MAinow has observed, "to maintain any
historical basis for the equivalent of an antiestablishment
clause when it comes to families." 153 Indeed, an obligation of
complete neutrality would be impossible to square with "the
widely held view that the expression of contemporary beliefs
and values is one of family law's most important functions." 154
150. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
151. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
152. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (em-
phasizing the profoundly "intimate and personal" nature of the decision
whether to terminate a pregnancy); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1987)
(emphasizing the importance of marriage to individual well-being in recogniz-
ing the right to marry while in prison); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for
Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (stating that "the importance of the
familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from
the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association");
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (suggesting that heightened protection
of the right to abortion is justified by the gravity of the consequences women
might suffer as a result of state-coerced childbearing); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (explaining heightened protection for the decision to marry
on grounds that marriage is essential to personal happiness); Skinner v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (emphasizing the grave
imposition on the individual of forced sterilization); see also DANIEL A.
FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 246 (1998) (noting that "religion is consid-
ered a core example of the kind of personal autonomy which the liberal state is
pledged to protect," and that "[firom this perspective, the right to be a funda-
mentalist Christian and the right to gay marriage are similar: both involve
central aspects of personal autonomy").
153. Minow, Free Exercise of Families, supra note 19, at 936.
154. Garrison, supra note 36, at 842; see also Carl E. Schneider, The Chan-
neling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 497-98 (1992) [here-
inafter Schneider, Channeling Function]; Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 547-48;
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It does not necessarily follow, however, that "[a]bsent an anti-
establishment clause, there is no governmental obligation to
strive for neutrality."155 Indeed, on several occasions, the Su-
preme Court has insisted that the Constitution's limitations on
state regulation of family are meant to prevent majoritarian
"standardiz[ation]" of family life. "[Tihe Constitution," Justice
Powell explained in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, "prevents
[the state] from standardizing its children-and its adults-by
forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family pat-
terns."156 Justice Brennan surely overstated the point when he
flatly asserted that the Court regularly had "declined to respect
a State's notion, as manifested in its allocation of privileges and
burdens, of what the family should be."157 Yet there is no doubt
that constitutional privacy protection is meant to ensure that
individuals, at least within certain boundaries, are free to give
order and meaning to their own intimate relationships. 58
Yet the boundaries that ultimately cabin private choice
have often been defined in family privacy cases in terms of his-
tory and convention. The overstatement in Justice Brennan's
assertion about the Court's intolerance for public channeling of
family life is evidenced by the result of the very case in which
he made it.' 59 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., a splintered Court
upheld a California statute that denied family status to a man
and the daughter he sired during an affair with the girl's mar-
ried mother.' 60 In a plurality opinion, Justice Scalia rejected
the man's constitutional claim to preserve the emotional rela-
Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U. C. DAVIS L.
REV. 991, 1004-07 (1989).
155. MAinow, Free Exercise of Families, supra note 19, at 944.
156. 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977). Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1928), the Court explained the invalidity of Oregon's law man-
dating public education on the ground that the Constitution "excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only." Id.
157. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 145 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). In the same passage, Justice Brennan also insisted that "many cases
[have] prevent[ed] the States from denying important interests or statuses to
those whose situations do not fit the government's narrow view of the family."
Id.
158. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784
(1989) (arguing that the right of privacy guards against "a society standard-
ized and normalized, in which lives are too substantially or too rigidly di-
rected").
159. For an articulation and defense of this "channeling function," see gen-
erally Schneider, Channeling Function, supra note 154.
160. See 491 U.S. at 121-24.
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tionship he had established with the girl on the ground that
this was not the sort of family relationship that enjoyed "tradi-
tional respect in our society."161 A majority of the Court in
Bowers v. Hardwick refused to extend constitutional protection
to homosexual relations on essentially the same ground. 162 In
Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Moore, but a few para-
graphs before he asserted the Constitution's condemnation of
family standardization, he linked constitutional protection for
the family closely to traditional conceptions of family life. 163 In
deciding whether the Constitution gave shelter to the family
claimants in that case, Justice Powell looked to the validation
of history: Inez Moore's family was "deserving of constitutional
recognition," he concluded, because society had long venerated
the choice of grandparents to live in the precise extended-
family configuration chosen by the Moores. 164 Accordingly, in
the context of family privacy, norms of neutrality and an appre-
ciation of pluralism often coexist uneasily with a sense that so-
ciety legitimately may act to advance its own conception of fam-
ily. There is indeed a durable norm of state neutrality evident
in the Court's rejection of excessive standardization, but that
norm is quite often enforced only within a range of choices
deemed acceptable by deeply rooted societal consensus. 165
Conventional understandings also play some role in defin-
ing "religion" under the First Amendment. Indeed, judicial ef-
forts to identify the boundaries of both religious liberty and
family privacy ultimately reflect what Martha Minow has iden-
tified as a broader and more general "ambivalence over plural-
ism within American history and constitutional traditions." 166
161. Id. at 123 n.3.
162. 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986).
163. See 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("[Ihe Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the fam-
ily is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.").
164. Id. at 504; see also id. at 505-06 (qualifying the Courts affirmation of
constitutional protection for the extended family by noting that protection
would be extended at least to families related by the "degree of kinship" pre-
sent in the Moore family).
165. This statement must be qualified with the phrase "quite often" be-
cause on other occasions the Court has extended constitutional protections to
family choices or relationships-including interracial marriage, marriage
while incarcerated, and abortion-for which there was no historical consensus
of acceptance. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
166. Minow, All in the Family, supra note 10, at 278; see also id. at 297-305
(discussing manifestations of this ambivalence in conflicts over religion, child
welfare, and educational multiculturalism).
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When confronted by a novel claim of religious adherence, many
judges and scholars ultimately resort to comparisons between
the putative religion and more traditional belief systems that
indisputably qualify as religious.167 Any approach to defining
"religion" that recommends such comparisons, or that identifies
the "essential elements" of religiosity by drawing from familiar
faiths, is inevitably bringing conventional understanding to
bear in the process. 168 Yet the effect of this influence-so long
as the comparisons or "essential elements" are kept sufficiently
general, as they have been in modern practice-is only to en-
sure some rough correspondence between the new religion and
contemporary consensus about what constitutes religion. The
question is essentially whether, squinting hard, a court can see
sufficiently important similarities between the claimed religion
and those things conventionally understood to be religions; it is
not whether the particular belief system or entity before the
court can itself claim age-old veneration or "traditional respect
in our society."169 Thus, proponents can still accurately insist
that these approaches to defining religion, even as they take
account of conventional understandings, are "sufficiently flexi-
167. See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(Adams, J., concurring) ("The modern approach thus looks to the familiar re-
ligions as models in order to ascertain, by comparison, whether the new set of
ideas or beliefs is confronting the same concerns, or serving the same pur-
poses, as unquestioned and accepted 'religions.'"); see also United States v.
Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483-84 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying test proposed in
Judge Adams' Malnak concurrence); Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
662 F.2d 1025, 1032-33 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); Choper, supra note 106, at 594
n.89 (noting that "the Judeo-Christian religious tradition is dominant in our
culture and, whether rightly or wrongly, all other beliefs seeking recognition
as religious tend to be compared to it"); id. at 599 (acknowledging that the au-
thor's proposed "extratemporal consequences" test for defining religion "proba-
bly conforms more than the 'ultimate concerns' approach with the conven-
tional, average-person conception of religion"); Freeman, supra note 115, at
1553 (suggesting that putative religions be compared to a "paradigm" of relig-
ion derived from elements common to many "traditional Eastern and Western
religions"); Greenawalt, supra note 106, at 753 ("[C]ourts should decide
whether something is religious by comparison with the indisputably religious,
in light of the particular legal problem involved."); Pefialver, supra note 100,
at 820-21 (endorsing a "family resemblance" approach to defining religion, in
which, among other criteria, "the ultimate goals pursued by adherents to the
belief system in question may be compared with those pursued by members of
the many world religions").
168. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 106, at 599-600; Peflalver, supra note
100, at 812-18; Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1056, 1074-75 (1978).
169. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1988) (Scalia, J., plu-
rality opinion).
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ble and capable of growth to include newly perceived and un-
conventional values"17 0 within the scope of First Amendment
protection.
The similarities between the policies underlying the Con-
stitution's guarantees of religious liberty and family privacy are
strong enough to cast serious doubt about the propriety of en-
forcing a narrow and heavily traditional definition of family.
Even though pluralism is not valued as highly in the family-
privacy context as in the modern First Amendment cases, re-
spect for personal autonomy and the associated concern for
what Jesse Choper has called the "'special cruelty' factor"71
fully justify at least a heavy skepticism of family "standardiza-
tion." Recognizing the crucial role of family in the lives of indi-
viduals, and the cruelty that would be imposed by public meas-
ures that damage or destroy genuine and heartfelt
constructions of family life, some wider latitude for self-
definition of family seems appropriate to the underlying consti-
tutional values.
Precisely what form that wider latitude should take is
surely open to debate. Certainly, experience with the Religion
Clauses, as well as with family law generally, suggests several
possible approaches, including comparative methodologies and
functional or essence-based definitions. And, as in the context
of religion, something more than sincere self-definition as "fam-
ily" must surely be required. A "view of the family only as a
collection of individuals who come together in a contractarian
arrangement for so long and for such purposes as they choose"
will strike most as "deeply unsatisfying."172 Such a view seems
170. Choper, supra note 106, at 599; see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 245-46 (1982) (contending that the Court's approach to the Free Exercise
Clause gives protection to "small, new, or unpopular denominations" as well as
traditional religions); Pefialver, supra note 100, at 821 (contending that the
proposed methodology for defining religion by comparisons to many world re-
ligions simultaneously "closely adheres to our use of the term 'religion' in eve-
ryday language" and "leaves ample room for the methodology to expand in the
future as our use of the word 'religion' in everyday language changes").
171. Choper, supra note 106, at 599; see supra note 146 and accompanying
text.
172. Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 545; see also MILTON C. REGAN, JR.,
ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999); REGAN,
supra note 23; Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 580-81. As Martha Minow has ob-
served, " Te danger of an expansive, finctional voluntarist view of family-in
which people can pick and choose what kinds of family ties that they want to
have-is that people will choose to walk out when it gets tough and to avoid
responsibilities when it is no longer fim." Martha Minow, Redefining Fami-
lies: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 283 (1991) [hereinaf-
830 [Vol.86:791
FATH AND FAMILY
hollow because it "leaves little room for the sense of commit-
ment experienced by and valued in family life."17 3 Even squint-
ing hard, few would recognize important commonalities be-
tween a transitory association of college roommates and
established conceptions of family;174 what is missing from their
association is the crucial substance of attachment-love, re-
sponsibility, dependency, durability-that characterizes past
relationships known to us as "family."175 Just as with religion,
drawing the outer boundary of protection with reference to
such a contemporary assessment of the essence or core function
of family would take some account of modern convention while
leaving room for the emergence and recognition of new individ-
ual conceptions of family.176 For the purposes of this Article, it
is enough to point out that any of these approaches would be
capable of giving greater latitude than the tradition-oriented
approach and thus any would likely constitute an improvement
over current doctrine.
IV. LIVING WITH BROAD CONCEPTIONS OF FAMILY
AND RELIGION: TOWARD MODERATED, BUT FRANKER,
STANDARDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
This proposal to broaden the scope of "family" protected by
the Constitution has so far reckoned only indirectly with the
powerful sense that society has a legitimate role to play in ad-
vancing its own preferences concerning the construction of fam-
ily life. As discussed previously, the Supreme Court has some-
times sought awkwardly to accommodate this conviction along
with its stated hostility to family standardization in the course
of drawing the boundaries of "family" protected by the Consti-
tution.17 7 Broadening the Constitution's definition of family
ter Minow, Redefining Families].
173. Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 554.
174. Cf. Borough of Glassboro v. Valiorosi, 568 A.2d 888, 894-95 (N.J. 1990)
(per curiam) (construing a state statute's definition of family to include ten col-
lege sophomores living together).
175. It is on this basis that Barbara Woodhouse has proposed a functional
definition of"family" that would differentiate between "kinships of responsibil-
ity" and mere "associations of choice." See Woodhouse, supra note 3, at 580-
83. Similarly, Martha Minow has advocated for a functional definition that
would focus upon the obligations that are implicit in understandings of family
relations. See Minow, All in the Family, supra note 10, at 305-10; Minow, Re-
defining Families, supra note 172, at 277-83.
176. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 153-65.
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would honor family pluralism but, in doing so, would leave less
room for exerting state preferences. Public consensus about
family would continue to exert some constraint on the scope of
protection, but its role, and its channeling effect, would be sub-
stantially diminished. Yet, as is suggested more fully below,
the state's legitimate channeling function in family law could
be better accommodated not through definition of family at the
threshold of constitutional analysis, but later, in a forthright
balancing of the competing state and individual interests. As it
stands now, the state is permitted to channel families toward
preferred forms on a bare showing that the state's preferences
coincide with deeply rooted societal assumptions about the fam-
ily; tradition becomes, in effect, self-justifying.17 8 Under the
approach advanced here, however, the state more often would
be put to the burden of justifying its preferences through refer-
ence to more pressing public interests than the empty per-
petuation of tradition.
A. A DEEPER COMMONALITY: CONTAINING THE COSTS OF
ACCOMMODATION
So far, this Article has contended that similarities between
the policies underlying religious liberty and family privacy, and
between the roles of religion and family in the lives of individu-
als, support greater similarity in the judiciary's approach to de-
fining religion and family. There is yet another similarity be-
tween the two constitutional contexts, however, which may
partly explain the Supreme Court's reluctance to be more gen-
erous in defining family for purposes of the Constitution.
At the core of both the Free Exercise and family-privacy
guarantees is a common dilemma: If enormous weight is given
to the "fundamental" liberty (in the form, for example, of "fatal-
in-fact" strict scrutiny79), and if individuals are then given
178. A state imposition upon non-conforming family life would still, of
course, be subject to rational basis review. Given, however, the minimal de-
mands of that test generally and, in particular, the Court's past willingness to
accept the enforcement of traditional moral conventions as a sufficient justifi-
cation for state action under rationality review, see, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), a conclusion that the state's regulation comports
with traditional notions of family is tantamount to proving its constitutional-
ity.
179. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (describing strict scrutiny as almost always "automatically fatal"); Ful-
ilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (using a
similar description); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
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wide berth to define for themselves whether they are entitled to
this high-powered protection (by way of great deference to the
individual in defining "religion" or "family"), society might be
"courting anarchy."180 As the Court once acknowledged, "It is
readily apparent that virtually every action that the Govern-
ment takes, no matter how innocuous it might appear, is poten-
tially susceptible to a Free Exercise objection," 181 and the same
might well be said in the context of the family. The ability to
govern might be continually stymied by the demands for special
exemptions by a proliferating number of "religions" claiming,
perhaps even sincerely, a faith-based objection to taxes, or mili-
tary service, or drug laws, and so on, 182 and by the demands of
an equally far-flung universe of novel associations to the spe-
cial favoritism shown "families" under the Constitution. "[Tlhe
very concept of ordered liberty," the Court warned in Yoder, a
case which itself arose at the intersection of religious and fam-
ily freedoms, "precludes allowing every person to make his own
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole
has important interests."183
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing strict scrutiny as 'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact").
180. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,888 (1990).
181. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707 n.17 (1986); see id. at 712 (holding
that the Free Exercise Clause did not exempt religious objectors from a law
requiring use of social security numbers by beneficiaries of certain welfare
programs).
182. There have been a number of recent claims for exemptions. See, e.g.,
Jed Michael Silversmith & Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Between Heaven and
Earth: The Interrelationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Re-
ligion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 467 (2001) (considering
claims for religious exemption from copyright laws); Laura L. Coon, Note, Em-
ployment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of
the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Deci-
sions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 481 (2001) (considering claims for religious exemption
from employment-discrimination laws); Michael I. Ryan, Note, A Requiem for
Religiously Based Property Tax Exemptions, 89 GEO. L.J. 2139 (2001) (consid-
ering claims for religious exemption from taxes).
183. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972); see also Smith, 494
U.S. at 888-89; W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (warning against a construction of the Free Exer-
cise Clause that would permit "each individual... [to] set up his own censor
against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the public good by those
whose business it is to make laws"); CHOPER, supra note 99, at 62 (observing
that "if the courts were unqualifiedly to apply heightened scrutiny to every
government regulation that appeared to have the effect of restricting individ-
ual religious freedom, the diversity of religious beliefs in the United States-
which continues to increase-would make virtually 'every regulation of con-
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Yet, the Supreme Court has responded to this common di-
lemma in different ways in the two contexts. In the Free Exer-
cise area, the Court has come to be quite generous in allowing
individuals to bring their claim of faith within the scope of pro-
tected "religion," permitting individuals considerable freedom
to define for themselves whether they are acting pursuant to
religious belief.184 Yet the Court has mitigated the implications
of that generosity by narrowly containing the substantive pro-
tection that status confers. In early cases, the Court cabined
the Constitution's substantive protection by means of a "belief-
action" distinction, which gave protection to internal thoughts,
but not to conduct. 8 5 In recent years, after the articulation of
the "compelling interest" test as applicable to governmental re-
strictions of religious practices,18 6 the Court sometimes seemed
duct' open to challenge") (footnotes omitted); MORGAN, supra note 126, at 150-
51; NOONAN & GAFFNEY, supra note 134, at 329; 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAY, supra
note 95, at 528 ("If the Court did not narrow the potential group of persons
who could claim the exemption, a ruling finding that the government must
create a religious exemption from the criminal law would make compliance
with the law optional for every person."); TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1194 (ob-
serving that "[olne reason the Court has granted only a few free exercise ex-
emptions may be the fear that, once easy accommodations are granted, neu-
trality will demand that more difficult accommodations be granted as well");
Choper, supra note 106, at 592; McConnell, Origins of Free Exercise, supra
note 143, at 1493 (noting the practical concern that "if the exercise of religion
extends to 'everything and anything,' the interference with ordinary opera-
tions of government would be so extreme that the free exercise clause would
fall of its own weight") (citations omitted); Richard John Neuhaus, A New Or-
der of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 620, 630-31 (1992). Indeed,
fears that constitutionally mandating religious exemptions ultimately would
"subvert all civil liberty" date back to the original debates over the Free Exer-
cise Clause. See Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Ex-
emption:An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 941 (1992).
184. See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) ("Laws
are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."). For a cogent
critique of this distinction, see TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1183-84. See also
McConnell, Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 143, at 1488-90 (contending
that text and historical understanding support the conclusion that "freedom of
religion was almost universally understood... to include conduct as well as
belief').
186. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) ("A law burdening religious practice that is not neu-
tral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.
To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious
practice must advance 'interests of the highest order' and must be narrowly
tailored in pursuit of those interests.") (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 628 (1978)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
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to "water down" the scrutiny that it actually applied.18 7 And
still more recently, in Employment Division v. Smith,188 the
Court jettisoned any form of heightened scrutiny altogether for
cases in which the state has burdened religious exercise by way
of a generally applicable law.189 By current understanding,
then, the Free Exercise Clause gives believers, essentially, only
a prohibition against discriminatory state persecution, a guar-
antee that largely duplicates protection given elsewhere by the
equal-protection guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 90 With substantive protection amounting to so
little, the Court can afford to be generous in doling it out. 191
187. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (stating that
many laws would not meet the "compelling interest" test if the test were ap-
plied faithfully); see also Choper, Religious Freedom, supra note 126, at 1724-
25 (noting frequent deviation between Court's rhetoric of strict scrutiny and
actual practice); Christopher V. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulner-
ability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Con-
duct, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994) (describing the Court's standard of
review as "strict in theory but feeble in fact"); Robert D. Kamenshine, Scrap-
ping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 147-49,
154 (1987) (concluding that the de facto use of a "more lenient... middle-tier
standard" is just one of "[sleveral potential 'outs' [the Court employed to per-
mit it to] maintain nominal adherence to strict review"); Ira C. Lupu, The
Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 756 (1992) (describ-
ing the Court's "standard of review [as] ... strict in theory, but ever-so-gentle
in fact"). But see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 570 & n.5
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disputing
Smith's "impli[cation] that the Court, in considering claims for exemptions
from formally neutral, generally applicable laws, has applied a 'water[ed]
down' version of strict scrutiny").
188. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
189. For criticisms of the way in which Smith narrowed the scope of sub-
stantive protection under the Free Exercise Clause, see Jesse H. Choper, The
Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 NEB.
L. REV. 651, 670-86 (1991), Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10-39, and Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revi-
sionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CIu. L. REV. 1109, 1129-53 (1990). For
an argument that these criticisms are greatly overstated, see Mark Tushnet,
The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REV. 117, 118-29.
190. See CHOPER, supra note 99, at 41-44, 64-65 (discussing similarities
between the equal protection and the free exercise doctrine and concluding
that "protections for religious liberty are solidly grounded in the free speech
provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and would be readily se-
cured even if there were no Free Exercise Clause"); Choper, supra note 106, at
582-83. It is for this reason that Douglas Laycock has written that, "[in effect,
Smith repealed the substantive component of the Free Exercise Clause."
Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 841,855-56 (1992).
191. See CHOPER, supra note 99, at 62-63; Choper, supra note 106, at 591-
92 (stating that "[there is an obvious relationship between the legal definition
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Few claimants, despite passing the "religion" threshold, actu-
ally prevail against the government.19 2
In the family-privacy area, by contrast, the Court's tack
has been to stave off the anarchical implications of excessive
constitutional solicitude by remaining much more selective
about who may claim "family" status. In other words, when it
comes to "religion" the Court's tack is to be generous in its defi-
nition, but relatively stingy in the substance of protection that
follows, whereas when it comes to "family," the Court has
tended to be more stingy in its definition, while claiming to be
more expansive in the substantive protection accorded family
status.
Part of the Court's reluctance to construe family more
broadly is explained by its nominal adherence to strict scrutiny
as the substantive standard of protection once a significant in-
cursion on family liberty is found. In past cases, the Justices
of religion and the shaping of substantive doctrine under the free exercise
clause" and that "it is unlikely that an extremely broad definition of religion
will be permitted to coexist with an extremely generous protection of the
claims that fall within that definition").
192. See, e.g., 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 95, at 519 (noting that
"[tihe Supreme Court has invalidated very few government actions on the ba-
sis of the free exercise clause"); TRIBE, supra note 95, at 1194 (noting that, de-
spite its generosity in defining the scope of protected religion, "[iun practice,
the Court has placed significant hurdles in the way of free exercise claim-
ants"). This was true, moreover, well before Smith curtailed the substantive
protection offered by the Free Exercise Clause:
As Judge Noonan and others have shown, the actual protection af-
forded religious exercise by the Supreme Court and federal appellate
courts applying pre-Smith law is not nearly as great as post-Smith
rhetoric suggests. One enumeration lists seventeen Supreme Court
cases between 1963 and 1990 addressing free exercise claims, of
which only four (twenty-three percent) prevailed. Similarly, out of
ninety-seven cases in the courts of appeals during the 1980s, free ex-
ercise claims prevailed in only twelve (twelve percent). Another arti-
cle, compiling almost one hundred pre-Smith cases from state su-
preme courts and federal courts of appeals for a period ending in
1989, found that the free exercise claim was sustained in only four-
teen of eighty-five cases (sixteen percent)....
... Of course a twenty-five percent chance of winning, under pre-
Smith law in practice, is better than no chance of winning under
Smith. Still, the change occasioned by Smith is not a change from the
bright daylight of religious freedom to the dark night of religious per-
secution. If the metaphor is apt, even before Smith it was deep twi-
light.
Tushnet, supra note 189, at 121-22 (footnotes omitted); see also 4 ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 95, § 21.6, at 526; id. § 21.8, at 537 (observing that "even
during the era of the balancing test the government won virtually every case
which did not involve the punishment of religious beliefs").
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have openly worried that an expansive conception of family
would-on the assumption that strict scrutiny is "strict' in the-
ory and fatal in fact"' 93-require the evisceration of a wide
swath of traditional regulations of family life, many of which
undoubtedly strike the Justices as perfectly sensible. 194 Al-
though the Court has often moderated the rigor of its scrutiny
in family-privacy cases, the nominal retention of strict scrutiny
nevertheless would force awkward and unwelcome maneuvers
on the Court if it were to broaden substantially the constitu-
tional concept of family.195
All of this produces a quite unsatisfactory state of affairs.
In order to avoid the costs of excessive accommodation, a great
many claimants are now denied any meaningful protection
whatsoever under either set of constitutional guarantees. Un-
conventional claimants, in particular, are likely to find little or
no help (except in the thankfully rare instance in which gov-
ernment persecutes a particular religious sect1 96).
B. OPEN BALANCING AS AN ALTERNATIVE
There is, however, an alternative that would not create the
anarchy or radical accommodation feared by the Court. The
Court might, in both contexts, be generous in defining the pro-
tected classes-i.e., allow greater room for "self-definition" of
family as well as religion-while abandoning its absolutist pre-
tensions with regard to the substantive protection conferred by
these constitutional guarantees. 197  Abandoning pretenses
193. See supra note 179.
194. In Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 392 (1978), for instance, several
of the Justices contended that traditional restrictions on entry into marriage-
such as laws barring bigamous, incestuous, or under-age marriages-should
be sustained without triggering strict scrutiny. See id. at 392 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
195. See Meyer, Paradox, supra note 56, at 564.
196. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye was such a case, striking down
(even after Smith) an ordinance crafted deliberately to prohibit practice of the
Santeria religion. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 545-47 (1993).
197. See Choper, supra note 106, at 591-92 (noting that "a spacious judicial
definition of religion need not necessarily lead to greater protection for reli-
gious freedom" and that "[t]he ultimate reach of the free exercise clause can be
expanded or limited by the Court at either the definitional or substantive
steps of the process"); Greenawalt, supra note 106, at 753-54 (contending that
"a threshold determination that religion is present [in a free exercise case]
should not automatically invoke use of the compelling interest test or similar
standards of review").
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about the judicial role once these guarantees are triggered-
either by recognizing that strict scrutiny need not be "fatal in
fact," as the Court has recently done in the context of affirma-
tive action, 198 or by embracing more forthrightly some form of
intermediate scrutiny' 99 -would permit the Court to be more
generous in defining "family" without seriously compromising
society's ability to assert important interests in channeling
family life.2°°
This change would not necessarily result in a significant
net gain in the number of successful family-privacy (or free-
exercise) claims. Many traditional restraints on family forma-
tion or the conduct of family life might continue to be sustained
against constitutional attack. The approach advocated here,
however, would dramatically alter the manner in which courts
evaluate the constitutionality of such intrusions. Courts could
no longer rest validation of state action solely upon its histori-
cal pedigree or the novelty of the intimate affiliation upon
which it intruded. Instead, far more often, courts would be re-
quired to allow claimants past the threshold of constitutional
protection-recognizing their claim to family status-and pro-
ceed to evaluate the strength of the justifications for the regu-
latory measure. Thus, for example, in the recent constitutional
challenge to Florida's statutory ban on adoptions by homosexu-
als, it would not be dispositive to point out that the affiliation
between a foster parent and the child he wishes to adopt com-
198. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
199. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 570 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing Smith and con-
tending that if the free-exercise exemptions generated by a strict scrutiny ap-
proach were thought excessively burdensome for government, "it would argue
only for moderating the language of the [compelling-interest] test, not for
eliminating constitutional scrutiny altogether"); Kamenshine, supra note 187,
at 154. Elsewhere, I have argued that the Supreme Court should openly adopt
an intermediate-scrutiny approach to family privacy controversies. See Meyer,
Lochner Redeemed, supra note 63, at 1163, 1173; Meyer, Paradox, supra note
56, at 570-79.
200. A similar approach might usefully be employed in the free exercise
area. Instead of abandoning all heightened scrutiny of generally applicable
burdens on religion, as the Court did in Smith in order to contain the costs of
accommodation associated with a generous definition of religion, the Court
could simply have adopted some form of intermediate scrutiny. See Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 570 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Such an approach would avoid locking in the
Court to granting excessive exemptions while leaving the possibility of at least
some meaningful constitutional protection.
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menced on different terms from traditional families.201 The
court in that case, after all, had concluded that the emotional
bonds between the putative family members-children and the
adults who had acted for years as their only caregivers-were
every bit as substantial as those linking parents and children
in traditional, biological families.202 Under any of the more ex-
pansive formulations considered here,20 3 the court would surely
be bound to acknowledge the legitimate claim of their "deeply
loving and interdependent relationship"2°4 upon constitutional
recognition. The ultimate judgment of the law's constitutional-
ity then would rest upon a determination of whether the state's
interests in withholding adoptive status outweigh the resulting
incursion on family intimacy.
To be sure, calling on judges to weigh the benefits of state
action against the costs to those burdened inevitably entails all
the familiar drawbacks of balancing tests. Such an approach is
inherently indeterminate and therefore less predictable in op-
eration.20 5 The indeterminacy is aggravated, moreover, by the
201. In Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2001), the
district court ruled that a gay man who, over the course of a decade, had
raised three foster children since their infancy could claim no fundamental
right of privacy in family status because he had no reasonable expectation of
permanence in the foster-care relationship. "Although the concept of family,"
the court explained, "embraces relationships other than the archetypical nu-
clear family, the Constitution protects only those social units that share an
expectation of continuity justified by the presence of certain basic elements
traditionally recognized as characteristic of the family." Id. at 1379; cf Smith
v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977) (leav-
ing open the possibility of according some constitutional protection to foster
family relationships, but holding that any such protection would be "substan-
tially attenuated" when ranked against that of "the natural family").
202. Noting that the plaintiffs had raised and nurtured the children for
many years, in one case presiding full-time over the intensive medical care of
three children infected since birth with IlV, the district court did
not doubt that the emotional ties between [the children and their
caregivers are] quite close-as close as those between biological par-
ents. Nor does the Court doubt that a deeply loving and interdepend-
ent relationship between [the children and caregivers] exists....
[Ilntimate, highly personal parent-child relationships ... have [in
fact] been forged.
Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 172-76.
204. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
205. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972-73 (1987); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80 (1989); Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
56-69 (1992). Elsewhere, I have tried to suggest a doctrinal framework for an
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fact that in family-privacy and religious-liberty controversies
the competing values that must be balanced are often inc-
ommensurable. 2 6 And, as a result, it is also open to outright
manipulation or distortions caused by the natural tendency of
decisionmakers to discount the gravity or verity of unconven-
tional claims of harm.20 7
Yet, even admitting these quite real and legitimate con-
cerns, the approach advanced here would offer substantial
benefits over current doctrine. As an initial matter, having the
responsibility ultimately to answer for their intrusions-and to
provide an answer that goes beyond simply pointing out the
tradition of the intrusion-might lead government actors to
think harder about enacting intrusive regulations in the first
instance. Even without litigation, then, this might reduce the
number, or at least mitigate the heavy-handedness, of state in-
tervention into intimate life. In addition, quite aside from any
inhibiting effect on the ultimate scope of regulation, constitu-
tional recognitioi of a broader array of families would avoid the
expressive harms associated with the Court's current doctrinal
approach.208 Even if traditional regulations were still affirmed,
at least that affirmance would not be accompanied by the insult
of having been branded by the courts as "[un]deserving of con-
stitutional recognition" as members of a family.20 9
Moreover, the very flexibility that makes the intermediate
approach susceptible to manipulation and abuse also permits
intermediate-scrutiny analysis in this context that might at least mitigate
some of this indeterminacy. See Meyer, Constitutional Pragmatism, supra
note 87, at 725-32; Meyer, Paradox, supra note 56, at 575-94.
206. See CHOPER, supra note 99, at 93-94 (discussing religious liberty);
Meyer, Lochner Redeemed, supra note 63, at 1179-80 (discussing family-
privacy); Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment
"Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 88-89 (1988) [hereinafter Schneider, State-Interest
Analysis] (expressing skepticism of balancing in the family-privacy context on
this ground).
207. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 99, at 93-95; Mark Tushnet, "Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373,
382-83; cf Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (identifying
ways in which majority decisionmakers may unconsciously discount outsider
claims of harm in the context of race discrimination).
208. For a discussion of the expressive harms caused by the constitutional
denial of family status, see, for example, David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving
the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 803-
12 (1999), and Meyer, Paradox, supra note 56, at 565-71.
209. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
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conscientious judges to do a better job of comprehending the
full range of conflicting interests that are legitimately at stake
in many family-privacy disputes. As many scholars have long
noted,210 and as Justices have sometimes, though less often, ac-
knowledged, 211 family-privacy disputes are quite often ill-suited
to analysis within the conventional framework for individual
liberties. That framework understands constitutional conflicts
as two-way struggles between the state and private claimants
and tends to privilege one over the other (the individual under
strict scrutiny and the state under the rational-basis test).
Freeing judges from the confines of such blunt preferences cre-
ates room for creative and sensitive adjustment of the often-
complex web of competing individual and public interests in a
family.212
Finally, it bears emphasis that this approach would by no
means end the government's ability to express preferences con-
cerning family form and the conduct of family life. It would not
require rigid state "neutrality" toward all questions relating to
family, nor impose, as a matter of constitutional law, an atom-
istic ideal of what Milton Regan has aptly called the "optional
family," one in which the content and meaning of family rela-
tionships are consigned wholly or largely to individual prefer-
ence. 213 Although family law itself has undoubtedly moved in
that direction, 214 this movement is not necessarily mandated by
a proper understanding of the Constitution. Legislatures
would remain free, as they are today under current constitu-
tional doctrine, to make their own choices about the wisdom or
dangers of that trend. Yet, under the approach advanced here,
once the government has made its choice, it would more often
be required to justify its preferences concerning the construc-
tion or conduct of family life.
210. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMiPOvERISiENT
OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 121-30 (1991); REGAN, supra note 23, at 135;
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 295-96
(1988); Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL.
L. REV. 151, 157-58, 164-65 (1988).
211. See O'Connor, supra note 88, at 576 (acknowledging that "[iun family
cases, the rights of individuals are intertwined, and the family itself has a col-
lective personality. Thus, the due process model may not be the best frame-
work for resolving multi-party conflicts where children, parents, professionals,
and the State all have conflicting interests."); see also Meyer, Lochner Re-
deemed, supra note 63, at 1173-81 (discussing case law).
212. See Meyer, Lochner Redeemed, supra note 63, at 1184-85.
213. See REGAN, supra note 23, at 46.
214. See id. at 35-67; supra Part LA.
2002]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Instead of undermining the government's legitimate chan-
neling function in family law,2 15 this judicial review, and the
justificatory process it would require, could well enhance and
enrich that function. The case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,216 to
take just one well-known example, suggests how these benefits
might be realized. In that case, the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a statute that presumed conclusively that any child
born to a married woman in an intact marriage was a child of
the marriage. In doing so, the Court held that the State of
California was not constitutionally required to permit a man
other than the woman's husband to offer evidence that he was,
in fact, the child's biological father. The claimant in Michael H.
was prepared not only to offer compelling proof of his biological
paternity, but also to show that he had previously lived with
the child and her mother and had developed an emotional bond
with the child while helping to raise her.2 17 Moreover, it was
clear that enforcement of California's rigid statutory bar would
almost certainly cause him to be cut off from all further contact
with his daughter.218
There are perfectly sound reasons for concluding, as Pro-
fessor Regan has, that "[tihe conclusive paternity presump-
tion... may be the best we can do under difficult and painful
circumstances."219 Although the loss to the putative father of
the relationship he had begun to establish with his daughter is
undoubtedly very substantial, a contrary decision to strike
down the statute and hear the challenger's evidence might well
spell the end of other established family relationships, includ-
ing those between the mother and her husband and perhaps
between the husband and the child:
It's reasonable to believe that when at least one person [in a mar-
riage] has had an affair, and when a wife has begotten a child by an-
other man, a couple's desire to reconcile may be particularly fragile
and vulnerable to disruption.... [A] public recitation of events [by
way of a paternity challenge] that the spouses are doing their best to
215. Appreciation of family law's channeling function "reflects a belief that
law's purpose is not simply the passive accommodation of private behavior.
Rather, law may shape behavior in complex ways through its affirmation or
condemnation of various types of conduct." REGAN, supra note 23, at 136; see
also Schneider, Channeling Function, supra note 154.
216. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
217. See id. at 113-15.
218. See id. at 131; see also id. at 143-44, 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ob-
serving that as a result of the Court's decision the biological father was very
likely to lose all future contact with his daughter).
219. REGAN, supra note 23, at 137.
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put behind them [may well jeopardize their vulnerable marriage]....
The state has a legitimate interest in being concerned about this
prospect.2
20
Faced with a choice between these competing claims of
family, the state might reasonably prefer to cast its authority
behind the struggling marriage; the state is not required to be
"agnostic between them."22 1 Professor Regan thus makes a per-
suasive case that the state's interests in marital stability, in
the continuity of established patterns of childrearing, or in the
condemnation of adultery collectively or individually might jus-
tify the considerable intrusion on the claimant's family aspira-
tions.222
And, yet, the most notable thing about the plurality's con-
stitutional analysis in Michael H. was that it was not required
to reach these justifications. Instead, Justice Scalia short-
circuited the entire inquiry with the brisk assertion that the
likely biological father had no real "family" interest at stake to
begin with. Because the sort of father-daughter relationship
being asserted in this case lacked the "traditional respect [of]
our society,"223 Justice Scalia continued, it could claim no re-
spect, and no protection, from the Constitution. As Martha
Minow has pointed out, this basis for decision dodges the real
questions posed by the dispute in favor of a quick, conversation-
stopping escape:
A legal response that treats [unconventional family] claims as irrele-
vant and undeserving of attention expresses an act of state power to
supplant identities that people develop and assert. Of course, courts
might question and evaluate whether those relationships should be
recognized and protected, but the refusal even to discuss them is a
sheer imposition of judicial power in framing the question so it cannot
be discussed.2
24
220. Id. at 134.
221. Id. at 136.
222. See id. at 134-37.
223. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3.
224. MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND
THE LAW 69 (1997). Professor Minow continued,
What seems strange and indefensible in the Supreme Court's plural-
ity opinion in Michael H.... is the refusal even to permit debate over
[the challenged paternity presumption]. By refusing to consider the
possibility that Michael H. has a protected liberty interest in his rela-
tionship to the child, the plurality bypassed the inquiry into justifica-
tions for a presumption, cutting off his legal claims. Not only does
this approach redefine the shape of liberty interests protected by the
Court, it also treats the very issue of what cannot be questioned as
beyond debate.
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By abruptly shutting down the discussion in this way, and
resting decision on the bare force of tradition, the Court forfeits
an opportunity to add to the channeling effect of family law. A
decision that engaged the genuine difficulties of the case, how-
ever, by acknowledging the real sense of family created by Mi-
chael's caregiving and cohabitation with his young daughter
and then assessing his loss against the state's legitimate inter-
ests in marriage, childrearing, and morality, could do real work
to advance family law's channeling function. By identifying
and affirming what is ultimately most valued in family life, a
decision founded upon the demonstrable good of marriage, for
instance, or upon recognition of the harm caused by adultery,
could do much more to guide future behavior than one founded
upon the brute assertion of tradition.
To some, no doubt, the judicial role contemplated by this
constitutional understanding-articulating and enforcing what
is ultimately most valued in family life-will seem entirely too
adventurous and subjective. This approach, it might be feared,
would license judges to oversee and disrupt, according to their
own lights, the delicate political process through which family
law and policy are continually adjusted to fit shifting concep-
tions of public need and private interests. 225 Judges, by this
understanding, would be required to make judgments about
these matters, including contestable assessments of the costs
and benefits of particular family regulations, but this is inher-
ent in the very notion of a constitutional doctrine of family pri-
vacy.226 It is a considerable virtue of the approach proposed
here that it would bring those judgments out more clearly into
the open, while leaving room for public recognition of more
families as they actually exist in the here and now.
CONCLUSION
As the recent U.S. census data demonstrate, individuals
are already acting upon their own conceptions of family. And,
in significant ways, family law has been attempting to keep up.
Increasingly, the rigid statuses that once defined family law
Id. (citation omitted).
225. Cf. CHOPER, supra note 99, at 93-94 (criticizing the use of an interme-
diate-scrutiny approach in the context of the Free Exercise Clause on the
ground that it would require courts to make "legislature-like judgments" on
matters of policy); Schneider, State-Interest Analysis, supra note 206, at 88-95
(discussing faults of the intermediate scrutiny approach).
226. See Meyer, Lochner Redeemed, supra note 63, at 1182-90.
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are being replaced by measures that understand family roles
more fluidly and that are more deferential to individual concep-
tions of family, even when those understandings are quite un-
conventional. Constitutional protection for the family, how-
ever, has been notably less adaptive, with the Supreme Court
typically limiting protection to family forms or relationships
that can claim deeply rooted societal "respect."
This Article contends that the Court's experience defining
"religion" under the First Amendment provides a model for al-
lowing a wider-though not unbounded-role for self-definition
of "family" in constitutional law. The First Amendment model
is admittedly far from perfect, not least because the Supreme
Court has so limited substantive protection under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. It seems quite plausible, however, that the
Court has limited substantive free-exercise protection for pre-
cisely the same reason, in part, that the Court has resisted
broadening the concept of "family": fear that generous protec-
tion combined with a generous definition of the protected class
would hamstring society's ability to regulate its subjects, even
in quite reasonable ways. Openly embracing a more flexible,
intermediate scrutiny standard in both contexts would permit
more room for self-definition in areas of enormous importance
to the individual, but would also leave room for the retention of
many traditional state regulations on a demonstration of their
true reasonableness.
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